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The major findings of this study include the following:
(1)

When appeals judges were aggregated in terms of their scores

on criminal procedures cases, differences were observed in the voting

behavior of Nixon appointees as compared to non-Nixon Democrats and nonNixon Republicans during fiscal 1970 to 1973.
(2)

Nixon appointees voted more "conservatively" than these other

two judge groups.

Non-Nixon Democrats were the most "liberal" group,

and non-Nixon Republicans fell
(3)

in between the other two groups.

However, when the circuit was introduced as

a

control, it was

found that (a) the relationship between the three judge groups varied

from circuit to circuit with only six circuits conforming to the hypothesis;

(b)

the composite and median scores of Nixon appointees and non-

Nixon Republicans outside the South were virtually identical when only
the cases of fiscal
ual

1973 were considered; and (c) bloc analysis of individ-

circuits revealed that Nixon appointees do not constitute monolithic

and sharply "conservative" blocs in any but the District of Columbia

circuit, where voting patterns of Nixon appointees were similar to voting

patterns of Nixon appointees to the Supreme Court.

(4)

Moreover, when other background
characteristics were entered

as controls on the appointing
administration variable,

found to account for only

a

small

the latter was

proportion of the observed variances

,in voting behavior among the judges of
the Courts of Appeals.
(5)

There also appeared to be

a

relationship between the scores

of Nixon appointees and their sponsoring Republican
Senator, where one
existed.

The most "conservative" Nixon appointees were recommended,

for the most part, by the most conservative Republican
Senator, or were
the choices of the Administration in the absence of eligible
Republican

sponsors.

This suggests that Senatorial courtesy was an obstacle to

the attainment of preferred administration nominees.
(6)

Finally, doctrinal analysis of confession cases also indicated

that Nixon appointees did not always agree on confession issues, varying
in their legal

positions not only from circuit to circuit but within

some circuits.
(7)

The tentative conclusion, then, of this study

is

that,

although the Nixon appointees did appear more "conservative" when their
voting behavior was aggregated, they constituted, with the exception of
the District of Columbia circuit, nothing like the cohesive "conservative"

bloc of Nixon appointees which dominated criminal justice issues on the

Supreme Court over roughly the same period.
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INTRODUCTION

The bizarre end of the Nixon Administration
has seemingly closed

a

strident period of public struggle over the proper
role and direction of
federal court judges, particularly those on the
Supreme Court.

This

struggle, which centered around the liberal activism
of the Warren Court

majority from the middle 1950's to the late 1960's and the
conservative
reaction to that activism, has ended, largely because Richard
Nixon

appointed four conservatives to the Supreme Court.
As with the previous elections of Andrew Jackson and Franklin

Roosevelt, the election of Nixon engendered the highest hopes and the

deepest despair in those who respectively hated and defended the current
Court and the new President; for Nixon, like his famous predecessors,
explicitly promised new judges and, through them, nav law, although he

simultaneously seemed to disavow judicial policy making.
Public debate over the Court has now subsided largely because the

Supreme Court, led by the four Nixon appointees, has merely refused to
extend Warren Court reforms, thereby avoiding the more ostentatious
reversals of precedents.

Because

a

conservative revolution on the Court seemed imminent,

scholars carefully monitored the behavior of the Nixon appointees to the

Supreme Court.

On the other hand, less attention has been devoted to

assessing the impact of the Nixon appointees to the lower federal courts.

There are probably several reasons for this neglect.

For one thing, the

large numbers of judges and cases at those levels prohibits traditional

1

2

research involving the reading of
judicial opinions.

Moreover, comparison

of judicial behavior is very
difficult on the lower federal courts
as the
judges, for the most part, are deciding
different cases.
For instance,

district court judges usually sit alone
as trial judges, while judges
of
the eleven United States Court of
Appeals usually decide cases in panels

of three.

In only about one percent of their
cases do all

judges of a particular circuit sit en banc.

behavior even within

a

the appellate

So comparison of judicial

particular circuit must be at best tentative.

This problem of comparability of judicial behavior
in the lower courts
also has the effect of inhibiting the use of the
newer quantitative

methods such as bloc analysis and scaling which have gained
acceptance in
studies of the Supreme Court.

Another reason for the neglect of the

lower courts is probably the assumption that cases are less
important and

interesting at that level because the lower courts do not exercise the
same degree of control over which cases they hear as does the Supreme
Court.

District and Circuit Courts, for the most part, must hear and

decide the cases that are brought to them, while the Supreme Court decides

which case to hear from among many submitted.
Lower courts are probably also neglected because of the limited

impact of any one lower court decision and their perceived lack of importance.

A panel or en banc decision in one circuit, although it may be

persuasive, has no binding effect on other circuits.
by a three judge Courts of Appeals panel

is

Normally

a

decision

limited to the parties

involved in the particular case, although en banc decisions of the circuit
are expected to control future panel decisions within (but not out of)
the circuit.

Supreme Court decisions, on the other hand, are statements

3

of law which theoretically bind all
officials in the United States.
a

Thus

broad 'impact" of the Supreme Court
decisions is assumed, although many

recent studies have shown that the degree of
compliance with Supreme Court
decisions certainly varies.

These are very good reasons for studying the Supreme
Court.

However,

there are cogent reasons for extending the study
of Nixon appointees beyond
the Supreme Court.

court decision.

Obviously, the Supreme Court cannot review every
lower

In fact, according to one scholar,

the Supreme Court

reviews and reverses only 1.4 percent of Courts of Appeals'
decisions.^
In other words,

the decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals are final

in almost 99 percent of the cases they decide.

Although there

is

little

doubt that most lower court judges are concerned about Supreme Court

review of their decisions, the possibility of Supreme Court reversal
remote.

is

Moreover, although the cases at the lower court levels are more

routine, some cases do provide opportunities for judicial discretion.

Thus

"court packing" could influence case disposition in the lower courts.

That

is

the problem and the focus of this dissertation:

to measure the

Impact, if any, of the Nixon appointees to the lower courts.
Such

a

study, however, must be carefully limited.

For one thing,

the study will concentrate on the one issue, criminal procedures, stressed
in Nixon's 1968 campaign.

Criminal procedures cases will be further

limited to just cases involving blue collar crimes because blue collar
cases seem more sharply to divide liberals and conservatives and to serve

Woodford Howard, "Litigation Flow in Three United States
Courts of Appeals," Law and Society Review VII, No. 1 (fall 1973),
^J.

,

p.

44

^

4

as

a

test of the attitudinal characteristics
of the judges.

This means

that such white collar crimes as embezzlement,
securities act violations,

income tax fraud and selective service violations
will be excluded from
the analysis as will such other crimes as bribery,
perjury, intoxicated

driving, false statement, flag desecration, and
obscenity prosecutions.

Secondly, the study will be limited to the Circuit Courts
of Appeals for
the fiscal period 1970 to 1973.

Thirdly, quantitative techniques will be

the primary method of analysis.

This will

involve the assigning of

numerical values to the votes of judges while ignoring their written

explanations of their votes.
in basic political

As Goldman has put it, the cases are viewed

terms of who

wim

and who loses and by implication

which broader political and social values are seemingly being fostered.
In this particular study, a numerical
all

pro-defendant votes and

votes.

a

value of "2" will be assigned to

numerical value of "0" to all anti-defendant

In cases where judges grant but also reject important parts of

defendant claims,

a

numerical value of "1" will be assigned to the votes

of judges favoring that position.

Moreover, when judges split three ways

in a non-unanimous decision, a value of "1" will also be assigned to the

middle position.
In ordar to determine the impact of the Nixon appointees on the dis-

position of criminal appeals, an arithmetic mean will be computed for all
the votes cast by Nixon appointees to the Courts of Appeals and this

figure between "0" and "2.00" will be compared with the arithmetic mean

^Sheldon Goldman, "Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of
Appeals Revisited," American Political Science Review LXIX, No. 2
(June 1975), p. 491.
,

5

of all votes cast by non-Nixon Republicans
(primarily Eisenhower appointees) and non-Nixon Democrats (primarily Kennedy
and Johnson appointees).
It is hypothesized that Nixon appointees will
have a lower arithmetic

mean, signaling less support for the criminally
accused than either of
the other groups.

Because the number of votes cast by individual judges varies from
as few as one to over a hundred in any given term of the
court, it is

possible that the disproportionate number of votes cast by only

a

few

judges in some of the busier circuits could distort the arithmetic mean
as in indicator of the attitudinal
a

characteristics of

a

judge group.

Thus

median score will also be computed for each of the three judge groups

which will ignore the

number of votes cast by individual judges, with

the exception that no judge will be included in the computation who

decides fewer than six non-unanimous or fifteen unanimous cases.

hypothesized that Nixon appointees will also have

a

It is

lower median score

than either of the other judge groups.

The major assumption underlying this study

is

that attitudinal dif-

ferences of the judges account for differences in support for the criminally accused, although many of these differences could be explained by
the fact that lower court judges are deciding different cases and deciding

them differently because the nature of the case left them little choice.

One way of minimizing, if not eliminating, this difficulty

non-unanimous cases separately.

is

to examine

It can be assumed with some confidence

that cases producing open dissent among judges do provide them with
choice.

with

a

a

Obviously many unanimously decided cases also provide judges
choice, but is is assumed that many also do not.

This is

6

particularly true in the criminal law field
where one appeal, no matter

what its merits, has become almost automatic.

Unanimously decided cases

then will be treated apart from, as well as
in conjunction with, the non-

unanimous cases.

It is expected that the non-unanimous
cases, because

they provide more opportunity for discretion,
will result in

a

wider

range of individual and group scores and will serve
as better indicators

of judicial values than will the unanimous decisions.

On the other hand,

the consideration of both unanimous and non-unanimous decisions
combined
is

expected to provide the best measure of the actual impact of the

Nixon appointees.

It is expected that, although Nixon appointees may

appear more "conservative" on the basis of the non-unanimous decisions,
the impact of appointing

a

more "conservative" group of judges may be

greatly minimized by the routine (i.e., non-discretionary) nature of many
criminal cases heard by the Courts of Appeals.

With two exceptions, no attempt will be made in this study to

classify and compare cases according to the legal issues involved.

These

two exceptions include claims of alleged coerced confessions and illegal

searches and seizures, issues prominently featured in the 1964 and 1968

campaigns of Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon respectively.

Voting in

these types of cases will be compared with voting in an "all other
criminal cases" category.

It is expected that Nixon appointees will

differ even more from the other two judge groups on the confession and
search issues than they will on the "all other cases" category, for it

is

believed that any screening process by the Nixon Administration would be
particularly concerned with approaches by potential nominees to these
controversial issues.

Cases will also be classified according to whether

•

7

the prosecution oricjin.tod at tho
stcte or federal

control

for the possibility that attitudes

level

in order to

toward states rights rather

than toward the criminally accused
influenced the disposition of criminal

appeals.

It is expected that both Nixon
appointees and non-Nixon

Republicans will score lower than the Democrats in
cases involving state
prosecutions, reflecting the greater concern
local

ol

the former groups on

and state autonomy.
In

addition

to

analyzing the behavior of aggregate judge groups,

the study will also focus on individual circuits in order
to determine

how many and which circuits conformed to the hypothesis that
Nixon appointees would be the most conservative group.

the southern circuits,

is

Only in the fourth and fifth,

it expected that non-Nixon Democrats will be

more conservative than Nixon appointees or non-Nixon Republicans.
fore,

There-

the aggregate analysis already outrinr>d will be done both witfi and

without those circuits included

to

control

for a possible distorting

effect they might have on aggregate totals.

This is particularly impor-

tant because of tho l.irge size of the fifth circuit which encompasses

the "deep" South

<irid

which by itself decides ncdr]y

criminal cases heard by

Although there

is

tfie

a

third of all

United States Courts of Appeals.

little reason

to

conclude that cases are more

comparable witfiin than b(>tween circuits, intra-circuit analysis does have
the advantage of Including cases in which judges sit together.

This

situation makes it possible to compute the percentage of the time
of judges hearing the same cases agree

usually known as bloc analysis.
wh(,'tfier,

witfi

one anotfier,

a

a

pair

form of an.ilysis

Through bloc analysis it can be determined

for instance, Nixon appointees tend

to

agree more readily with

8

other Nixon appointees or with non-Nixon
Republicans and Democrats.
Thus the degree of attitudinal cohesiveness
of Nixon appointees in

particular circuit can be estimated.

a

If this cohesiveness is lacking

in certain circuits where bloc analysis
is possible, or if Nixon

appointees score higher in criminal cases than either
or both other

judge groups in certain circuits, it may be assumed
that the Nixon

Administration met and failed to overcome
attempt to "pack" that particular circuit.
is

certain obstacles in their
One such potential obstacle

the custom of Senatorial courtesy whereby the Senator of
the Presi-

dent's party from

a

potential nominee's home state may single-handedly

veto Presidential appointments to the judiciary at the District and

Circuit Court levels.

In order to test the potency of this variable in

explaining possible variations in the voting behavior of Nixon appointees, scores of these appointees will be compared with Senate A.D.A.

scores of their sponsoring Republican Senator (where one exists) to see
if there is a correlation between the two.

Finally, this study will

include two other aspects designed to

measure the character of Nixon appointees to the Courts of Appeals.
First, Nixon appointees will be compared with the other two judge groups

while holding the age and religious affiliation of the judges constant.
These other variables have been found, in another study, to be related
in a statistically significant way to voting in criminal

cases.

And,

secondly, the study will also examine the written opinions of appellate

court judges in confession cases to see if quantitative findings of

3lbid.,

p.

501.
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attitudinal similarity or dissimilarity
are supported by similarity or

dissimilarity in the doctrinal positions taken
by judges on this key
issue.

The chapter outline into which the
previously discussed aspects

of the study are organized follows below.

Chapter K_

The first chapter will attempt to place the
Nixon

campaign against the court system in an historical context
by comparing
it with past campaign attempts to alter judicial policy
and/or institu-

tions to determine as much as possible the intentions of
the Nixon

Administration toward its judicial appointments.
Chapter II.

The second chapter will discuss the politics of the

judicial selection process by reviewing recent literature on the subject
and will offer

a

brief socio-political profile of Nixon appointees, non-

Nixon Democrats and non-Nixon Republicans to determine the potential of
and limits on judicial selection as an instrument for changing court
pol icy.

Chapter III.

The third chapter will try to assess the impact of

the Nixon appointments through

a

quantitative analysis of the voting

behavior of the judges of the United States Courts of Appeals in criminal
cases decided in fiscal 1973.

This analysis will include both unanimous

and non-unanimous cases.

Chapter IV.

The fourth chapter will attempt to identify the

attitudinal characteristics of the three-judge groups by focusing only
on non-unanimously decided criminal cases for the four-year period fiscal

1970-73.

This quantitative analysis will include the bloc analysis of

voting behavior in each circuit and the analysis of the relationship

between voting behavior and selected socio-political background

10

characteristics of the judges and the
correlation analysis of the voting

behavior of Nixon appointees and their
sponsoring Republican Senators.
Chapter V,

The fifth chapter will

involve

a

qualitative analysis

of coerced confession cases decided in the
Courts of Appeals during
fiscal

1973.

Doctrinal positions taken by Nixon appointees
on these

issues will be compared with doctrinal

issues taken by non-Nixon appoin-

tees to see how much these positions varied within
and between groups.

Chapter VL_

Finally, Chapter VI will summarize and attempt
to

explain the major findings, comment on the assumptions underlying
the
research, and suggest other research possibilities uncovered
by this
study.

CHAPTER

I

THE NIXON. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE COURT:
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Attacks on the wisdom and even the integrity
of the federal courts
have been frequent in American history.

This is understandable for the

federal courts in exercising their almost unique
powers of judicial

review have been embroiled in intense political
controversies from the
beginnings of the Republic to the present dayJ

In addition, the

Constitutional provision for separation of powers is designed
to produce

recurring confrontation between semi-independent branches of government.

Struggle and tension then are inherent features in
of this design.

a

political system

At the same time, the federal courts are dependent on

the President and the Congress to appoint their judges, provide their

funds, and determine their size, jurisdiction and structure.

The federal

courts are thus potentially vulnerable to their coordinate branches of

government which possess the formal power to significantly alter not
only their policy direction but their role and stature in the political
system as well.

Thus our federal courts lack the complete independence

^Charles Warren, The Suprema Court in United States History
(Boston:
Little Brown, 1926). Of several excellent histories. Warren's
is particularly sensitive to the political controversies that have
swirled around the court.
,

2

James Madison (probably). Federal ist no 51, in Hillman Bishop
and Samuel Hendel , Basic Issues in American Democracy (7th ed.. New York:
Appelton, Century, Crofts, 1973), p. 43.

n

12

that life tenure supposedly provides^ and our history
is replete with

instances of "court curbings" and "court packings"
that have influenced
judicial

policy.

4

Probably the principal protection for the courts against
such
onslaughts by their coordinate branches

is

the widely held public expecta-

tion that the courts should be subject to influence only
through the

appointment of new judges as vacancies occur.
power has been

a

^

Thus the appointment

principal means of effecting constitutional change.

Traditionally, the President has appointed his own partisans to
judicial vacancies roughly ninety percent of the time.^

Thus it is under-

standable that changes in political power are often accompanied by what
appear to be threats to the courts or to the policies they represent as

"^Robert Dahl , "Decision Making in a Democracy:
The Supreme Court
as a National Policy Maker," Journal of Public Law , VI, No. 2 (1957),
Dahl effectively refutes the notion that, historically,
pp. 279-295.
the Supreme Court has significantly protected minority rights against

majority action.
Instead, he argues that the Court, with few exceptions,
has followed the election returns and served to legitimize the dominant
political coalition in the country.
Dahl, of course, wrote before the
Warren Court of the 1960s dramatically expanded civil rights and civil
liberties.
The Warren Court experience does not necessarily refute the
Dahl thesis, but see Jonathan A. Casper, "The Supreme Court and National
Policy Making," American Political Science Review 70 (1976), in press.
,

^See generally VJalter Murphy, Congress and the Supreme Court
University of Chicago Press, 1962') and Robert Steamer, The
(Chicago:
Court
Supreme
in Crisis (Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press,
T97TT:
5

This distinction between legitimate and illegitimate attempts to
influence the Court has been drawn by C. H. Pritchett, Congress Versus
University of Minnesota Press, 1962), p. 119.
The Supreme Court (Minneapolis:
The American Bar Association
^Joel Grossman, Lawyers and Judges:
and the Politics of Judicial Selection (New York: John Wiley and Son,
Grossman documents this point with regard to the Supreme
1965), p. 216.
for the lower federal courts are presented in 20
figures
Court.
The
Quarterly
(1962), p. 1175.
Congressional

0
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those new in power begin to alter court
membership and, frequently, court
pol icies.

Patronage
Selection.

is

one reason for continuing partisanship
in judicial

Federal judgeships have been virtually
the most prized jobs in

government because of high pay, prestige, and
secure tenure.^

The party

in power then is anxious to award these
positions to their "faithful."

Policy though is the major source of controversy
over judicial

appointments.

The policy making functions of the federal courts
have

been apparent to interested partisans at least since
the Marbury case,^
but it has been mainly in this century that the intellectual
community,

including some of the judges, began to disabuse themselves and
others of
the notion that judges do not make law.

Now the distance between the

way judges have acted and what academicians, the legal
general

public would admit about them has narrowed.

struggle over the

G.

commurii ty,

and the

During the Senate

Harrold Carswell nomination to the Supreme Court,

Yale Law School professor Charles

L.

Senators could legitimately weigh

a

Black contended that United States
judicial nominee's attitudes toward

key public policy issues, in this case civil rights.^

Apparently Black's

argument was influential in the confirmation proceedings.

1

Similarly,

political scientist Joel Grossman has defended partisan (i.e., on the

^Harold Chase, Federal Judges: The Appointing Process (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1972), p. 29.
^

Marbury

v.

Madison

Cranch 137 (1803).

1

Black, "A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court
LXXVX, No. 1 (November, 1969), p. 650.
Nominees," Yale Law Journal
^C.

L.

,

^^Richard Harris, Decision (New York:
1971), pp. 94-96.

E.

F.

Dutton and Company,

2

^
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basis of party affiliation) judicial
selection, particularly for the

lower federal courts, because this allows,
he asserts,

a

rough estimate

of the potential behavior of nominees
to those courts J
This scholarly "sophistication" about the
sources of judicial

behavior

is

also apparent in the public press, the
campaign rhetoric of

politicians (as shown later), and the views of the
general public.
^^'^S'^^^k

A

article by Stewart Alsop claimed that policy views
were the real

sources of contention over the Abe Fortas, Clement
Haynsworth, and

Harrold Carswell nominations to the Supreme Court, as
well as with most
other high court appointments

J^

And academicians Walter Murphy and

Joseph Tanenhaus, who studied public reaction to Senator
Goldwater's
1964 anti-Court campaign, said they "...would not have anticipated that

theacademic debate about neutral principles of constitutional law would
have trickled down through all levels of society. ."^^
.

That judges make law has become almost

culture as well as in intellectual discourse.

a

dogma then in the popular
However, the "discovery"

of the political nature of the court has been magnified in this century,
first by the Court's obstruction of liberal economic measures arising out
of the progressive era and the New Deal and later by its championing of
civil

rights and liberties other than property rights.

These Court

policies, like others in the more distant past, have engendered

^^Grossman, Op. cit.

,

p.

storm

a

219.

1

Stewart Alsop, "The Myth and William Rehnquist," Newsweek
(December 6, 1971), p. 124.
^

^Walter Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, "Public Opinion and the
Supreme Court:
The Goldwater Campaign," Public Opinion Quarterly XXXXII
(Spring 1968), p. 48.
,

5
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of controversy^^ provoking campaign
attacks from Progressive LaFollette,

Republicans Goldwater and Nixon, and American
Party candidate Wallace.
In the present era,

Nixon, Goldwater, and Wallace
seemed most

concerned with the Warren Court's expansive
interpretation of the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment,
particularly as these constitutional

provisions were applied to limit the powers of
various state governments
to regulate race relations,

to cope with problems of lawlessness,
to elect

their officials to state and county governments,
to outlaw obscenity, and
to curb radical

political dissenters.""^

In part, the Nixon campaign

reflected the Eisenhower Administration's concern over the
liberal trend of
criminal justice decisions by the federal courts and the liberal
tendencies of federal judges

(eighty percent of whom were Democrats when the

Republican Party regained thp Presidency in igR?)^^ in this policy area.
Thus Republican concern was apparent long before the Warren Court decisions

of the 1960s "revolutionized" the administration of criminal justice,^''
and can be traced back to Republican Congressional hostility to the

Supreme Court's 1943 decision McNabb

v.

United States

.

Eisenhower,

14

Of course scholarly revelations about the political character of
court action may have contributed to the controversy over the court's
modern role.
1

An excellent review of the Warren Court's civil liberties decisions
can be found in Henry Abraham's Freedom and the Court (2nd ed.; New York:
Oxford University Press, 1972).
^^Chase, op. cit ., pp. 94 and 102.
Ibid

.

An early confession
""^McNabb v. United States 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
case involving a delay in arraignment prior to police questioning. The
Supreme Court nullified the conviction without ruling that the confession
was involuntary.
To be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
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however, avoided commenting on any
decisions of the Supreme Court, led by
his appointee Chief Justice Earl Warren;
and Nixon, then Vice President,

on one occasion, following the Court's
decision in Brown

Education

,

praised "the great Republican Chief Justice.

v.

The Board of

"''^

Following dramatic court decisions early in the
1960s on reapportionment, prayer in public schools, and as already
mentioned, criminal

procedures, opposition to the Court reached

a shrill

crescendo; and the

1964 Republican Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater peppered
his

campaign with critical references to the Court.

Goldwater and his anti-

court campaign were, however, overwhelmed by the "finger cn the nuclear
button" and economic welfare issues, and ihe conservatives lost their

chance to "turn the court around. "^^ Subsequent to that election.

President Lyndon Johnson's Supreme Court appointments of liberals
Abe Fortas and Thurgood Marshall, and his abortive attempted elevation of
Fortas to the Chief Justiceship and friend Homer Thornberry to an Associate

Justiceship, increased conservative fears over the future policy directions of the Court and the intentions of the Democratic Administration
in that regard.

Meanwhile, coupled with court decisions which in the eyes of some

seemed to undermine religion, encourage the breakdown of traditional
sexual morality, free known criminals, aid and abet communists, and mix

the races, there was an alarming rise in the crime rate, up 120 percent

^^

New York Times

,

Feb.

14,

1956, p.

18.

on

Murphy and Tanenhaus, loc. cit.
^^Theodore White, The Making of the President 1964 (New York:
Antheneum, 1965).
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from 1950 to 1968, according to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's

uniform crime reports.

Although statistics are suspect in
this field

due to problems of record keeping and
crime reporting (by victims), crime
and political dissent had, in the
1960s, dramatically coalesced in the
nation's major cities and particularly its
capital where race riots and
political demonstrations were often accompanied
by looting and vandalism.

Crime was thus televised and dramatized,

and

a

perceived breakdown in

public order and private morality became the
principal domestic theme of

Richard Nixon's successful 1968 campaign for the
Presidency.

Because

this campaign directly relates to the purposes of
this dissertation, it
is

useful

to discuss

it in some detail.

The 1968 Nixon Campaign

When in August of 1968 Richard Nixon accepted the Republican Party's

nomination for the Presidency of the United States, he summed up eight
months of campaigning for the nomination and previewed the subsequent

election campaign:
Let us always respect.
our courts and those who serve on them,
but let us also recognize that some of our courts in their
decisions have gone too far in weakening the peace forces as
against the criminal forces in this country.
Let our judges who have the responsibility to interpret our
laws be dedicated to the great principles of civil rights,
but let them also recognize that the first civil right of
every American is to be free from domestic violence. And that
right must be guaranteed in this country. 24
.

.

.

22

.

Crime and the Law, Congressional Quarterly (Washington,

1971), p.

D.

5.

0-3

Theodore White, The Making of the President 1968 (New York:
See generally Chapter 11
Atheneum, 1969).
^^New York Times, August 9, 1968,

p.

1.

C,
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In March, the candidate had pledged,

if elected,

to modify three

Supreme Court decisions which had broadened
the procedural rights of
criminal defendants, although he did not
identify the decisions.^'
May, he partially blamed Supreme Court
decisions Escobedo v.

In

Illinois

and Miranda v. Arizona for an eighty-eight
percent crime increase since

1960.^^

After the Miami Convention, ostensibly responding to
advice from
Republican Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts, Mr. Nixon
refrained
from criticizing specific court decisions.
courts in more general terms.

27

Thereafter he attacked the

In early October, over national

tele-

vision, he asserted that the Supreme Court had "injected social and

economic ideas into their opinions."

He promised therefore to appoint

judges who would interpret the Constitution "strictly and fairly. "^^

Three days before the election he told

a

nationwide radio audience that

members of the Supreme Court ware unfamiliar with criminal justice.

He

pledged to appoint as judges men with experience or great knowledge in
the field of criminal justice, who recognize that the "abused deserve as
on

much protection as the accused."

Campaign criticisms of the federal courts by major Presidential

contenders are rare.
^^
^^
^^

Ibid

.

,

In the nineteenth century the courts became an

March 11, 1968,

Ibid ., March 9, 1968, p.
Ibid

.

,

September

8,

33.

p.

1.

1958, p.

^^Ibid., October 4, 1968,

p.

29 Ibid., November 3, 1968, p.

78.

50.
79,
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issue only in the election of
1850 as the Republicans
responded to Dred
Scott V. Sanford^O and in 1895
when the Populists, angered
by monopoly,
income tax, and injunction decisions,
included an anti-Court plank in
^their platform.^^

In this

cent.ry, other than Nixon, only
LaFollette

(1924) and Wallace (1968) have made the Court
issue.

a

significant campaign

None of the latter three appealed
successfully to the voters,

Wallace receiving 13.4 percent of the vote,
LaFollette 16.5 percent, and

Goldwater roughly 39 percent.

Even Nixon received a plurality of
only

43.2 percent although the "harder line" on law and
order represented by

Nixon and Wallace campaigns attracted, in the
1958 election, roughly
56 percent of the popular vote,

a

mandate of sorts for the appointment of

strict constructionist judges, knowledgeable about
criminal justice and

sympathetic to "the peace forces as opposed to the criminal
forces."
Of the four contenders in this century, Nixon's
campaign most

resembled Senator Goldwater's in 1964.
decisions, specifically Mai lory

v.

Goldwater tied Supreme Court

United States and Mapp v Ohio

,

to the

rising crime rate and pledged to work to overturn by Congressional

action and constitutional amendment these and other Supreme Court decisions
which had favored excessively the rights of defendants in criminal prosecutions.

He also pledged to use his appointment power to "redress consti-

tutional

interpretation in favor of the public. "^^

In contrast,

the Progressive Party platform of 1924 promised to make

30

Kirk Porter and Donald Johnson, National Party Platforms 1840
1968 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1970), p. 2.
31

Murphy, Op. cit.

,

pp.

44-45.

^^New York Times, September 15, 1964, pp.

1

S

12.

-
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an

federal judgeships elective for
ten-year terms and to authorize Con-

gress to override Supreme Court decisions.

Similarly George Wallace,

the American Party candidate of 1968,
called for elected federal district

court judges and Senate reconfirmation of
Supreme Court judges after an
-3/1

unstated period.
Thus the Nixon campaign on the court issue
cut

a

middle course

between the more extreme institutional "reforms"
of Wallace and the
limited support for the Court offered by the Democratic
candidate

Hubert Humphrey. ^5

Republican Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew

attempted to distinguish his party's views on law and order
from Wallace's
He charged Wallace with using the law and order issue as a
"hatchet" and

attempted to tie law and order to social progress.

menting on Nixon's presentation of the crime issue

R.

t.o

B.

Semple, com-

thp Rppuhlican

platform committee at the convention, saw the candidate's "militance" on
law and order as designed to "head off Wallace in the border states, stem

fellow Republican contender Reagan's inroads into the south, and free

himself for

more liberal foreign policy position."

a

Nor did candidate Nixon appear to depart from public opinion in his

court criticism.

In a March

1968 Gallup Poll, the Gallup organization

found that sixty-three percent of Americans surveyed believed that the
33
^^
35

Porter and Johnson, Op. cit.
Ibid

.

,

pp.

Humphrey

s

pp.

252-254.

702-705.

position will be elaborated upon later in the chapter.

New York Times
37lb1d.

,

,

September

5,

1968, p. 40.
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""^-^^^^

r;"^^^

-------

t^e Co..t was ^Won,.
on t.e co.cea
confession cases.38

^amp

.eported

a

we.

,,,3

.ec,1„e 1n attU..es
favo.a.le to

Court f.o. fori,five percent favorable
in July
'yb/, to th.Vf.
'y 1967
thirty-six percent
favorable in
•

percent of the northerners
and Democrats .e,d
unfavorable attitudes toward
the court and Indicated
that the anti-Court
i.pulse was even stronger
a.o„g southerners and
Repub, icans.^0 3,.^,^
^^^^^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
a non-partisan .ethod
of Judicial selection.^^
A .onth later, in
August
Gallup reported that cri.e
was perceived as the top
problem in the country
by twenty-eight percent
of the respondents as
compared with thirteen percent Who Singled out race
relations and fifty-two
percent who indicated
the Vietnan War as the most
pressing national problem.
Cri.e had hardly
been mentioned in a 1966 survey
in which the Vietnam War.
racial strife,
and living costs had been
of greatest public concern.

In the three-monih

period between May and August
of 1968 those perceiving crime
as the major
issue had increased from fifteen
to twenty-eight percent.''^
Two September polls by Louis
Harris and Associates replicated
the

Gallup organization's findings
concerning the public mood.
38
39

Ibrd.

,

Ibid.

,

March

3,

1968, p. 40.

July 10, 1968,

p.

19.

^hbid.
^^Ibid.

,

August 4, 1968,

p.

45.

Harris reported

22

that eighty-one percent of his respondents
agreed that "law and order had
broken down in the country," and that
eighty-four percent believed a "strong

President co.ld make

a

difference" although the Supreme
Court was not

mentioned by respondents as

a

cause of crime.

A later Harris poll

reported that thirty-eight percent felt Nixon
could best handle the law
and order problem; Humphrey drew the support of
twenty-six percent and

Wallace was endorsed by twenty-one

percent."^"^

In the same poll, Harris also

found that respondents rejected by fifty-eight percent
to twenty-two per-

cent the statement that "politicians for law and order
were against
progress and negroes."

Sixty-three percent agreed that there could not

be law and order unless there was justice for minorities.
By thus stressing law and order while occasionally mentioning

justice and progress, the Nixon campaign harmonized with public concern
over crime, public dissatisfaction with the courts and

a

degree of public

sophistication with regard to the social causes of lawlessness.

Whether

the Nixon campaign or that of other candidates contributed to that opinion
AC

swing or merely mirrored it has not been determined.
But if the Republican candidate was in accord with views expressed

by the general public, he was not as attuned to the views of many in his

^^Ibid.

,

September 10, 1968,

p.

31.

44

^^

Ibid

.

,

September 13, 1958,

p.

52.

Ibid

.

,

September 10, 1968,

p.

31.

4fi

In their study of the
Murphy and Tanenhaus, Op. cit. p. 47.
1964 campaign the authors concluded that "Goldwater's complaints about
the rights of criminal defendants could
the court decisions on
There was simply
not possibly have had a great impact on public opinion.
little reaction to these rulings."
,

.

.

.
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party in Congress.

The positions of these Congressional
Republicans can

add another perspective to his
campaign.

C.

Herman Pritchett and

Walter Murphy both wrote books on the
vituperative "court curbing" activities of Republican Congressmen during
the eighty-fifth Congress (1958).

Probably the best known "court curbing"
proposal during this session was
the Jenner-Butler bill designed to restrict
appellate jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court in areas where the court had made
controversial decisions.
In addition,

fourteen other bills were introduced designed
to alter in

some way the process of choosing the judges themselves .^^

Pritchett and

Murphy agreed that the Republican Party in Congress was
virtually unanimous in support of "court curbing" just as Democrats outside
the South

were almost unanimously against

it.

Not only were Republicans in the

Congress widely separated from non-southern Democrats on the court issue,
they were also in disagreement with the Republican administration of

which former Congressman Nixon was the Vice President.

Pritchett

reported that only thirty of one hundred and forty-four Republicans in
the House supported President Eisenhower on the Jenner-Butler Bill.^^

credits Vice President Nixon with

a

key procedural ruling which made

adjournment possible without the adoption of
despite the fact that there was probably
the proposals.

50

p.

,

216.

.

^^Pritchett, Op. cit.
^^Ibid.,

p.

single one of the bills,

Senate majority for some of

These Republican Congressmen were

'^^Grossman, Op. cit.

Ibid

a

a

11.

,

pp.

127-128,

a

part of the same

He
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anti-court faction that Murphy and Tanenhaus
claim Goldwater "mobilized,

articulated and legitimized" in 1964.

Significantly neither President

Eisenhower nor Vice President Nixon were
identified with that faction in
Ten years later candidate Nixon still had
not become

1958.

a

"court

curber" in the sense of advocating insitutional
changes.

Democrats skirted the court issue in 1964 and 1968.

President Lyndon

Johnson claimed that the court "was not an appropriate
election issue,
Hubert Humphrey, in his acceptance speech for the 1968
Presidential nomination, weakly responded to the Nixon campaign that "the
answer

law and order problem

.

.

.

...

to the

does not lie in an attack on our courts, our

laws, or our Attorney General, "^^ but he offered no positive defense of

court policies.

In Congress,

some northern liberals supported the Omnibus

Crime Control and Safe Streets Act which had hit at Miranda
Wade

v.

Arizona,

United States (requiring counsel at policy "line ups"), and

V.

Mai lory v.

United States (a controversial 1957 confession case); so effec-

tive northern Democratic support for Court policy appears to have eroded
in the decade following the 1958 battles.

From either

a

more distant perspective or in the political context of

his own time, Richard Nixon's assault on the federal courts does not appear

^

hbid .,

pp.

123-124.

^^Murphy and Tanenhaus, Op. cit.

,

33-34.

CO

Hubert Humphrey, "Address to the Democratic National Convention,"
XXXIV, No. 22 (September 1968), p. 708.

Vital Speeches

,

Subsequently northern liberals supported
p. 172.
,
Harris
preventive detention.
including
package
President Nixon's crime
support)..
as the
this
(about
ized.
"rational
..
comments that these Senators
need
to
rid
and
the
area
this
need for progressives to take the lead in
could
taken."
be
the streets of fear before constructive approaches
^"^Harris, Op.

cit.
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to have been a radical

departure from American political
tradition or

popular opinion, but rather to have been
imbedded within

it.

If the

Nixon campaign was not unique, however,
his victory was, for by winning
the 1968 election he became the first successful
Presidential candidate
to promise to change judicial

policy on

a

specific issue.

Thus the

Nixon victory offers an exceptional opportunity
to inquire into the
potential of and limits on

a

national political movement frankly

attempting to change federal judicial policy through the
appointment
process.

56

This inquiry will begin by examining, in the next chapter,

literature concerning the judicial selection process.
55

Fred Graham, The Self-Inflicted Wound (New York: MacMillan Co.,
1970), p. 306.
Such notable court opponents as Andrew Jackson and
Franklin Roosevelt did not make court policy an election issue. Jackson'
numerous appointment opportunities made dramatic assaults unnecessary
and Roosevelt saved his infamous court "reform" bill for Congress.
However, 1936 was a referendum on the New Deal and in a broad sense,
opposition to the New Deal from conservative Justices of the Supreme
Court was an issue.
56

It is of course clear by now that criminal issues sharply divide
the Nixon four from the rest of the Supreme Court and particularly from
liberals Brennan, Marshall and Douglas. Only Byron White frequently
agrees with Nixon's appointees and these five, sometimes joined by
Stewart, have accomplished something of a constitutional revolution of
their own with regard to the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments to the
Constitution, although they have avoided the ostentatious overruling of
precedent so common during the Warren Court era. See particularly
Leonard Levy's Against the Law (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).

CHAPTER

II

THE SELECTION AND SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND
CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
OF
APPEALS:

EISENHOWER TO NIXON

As the last chapter indicates, candidate Richard
Nixon clearly and

repeatedly stated that, if elected, he would appoint "law and
order"
judges to the federal courts.

Four years later, as President, Nixon

acknowledged that pledge and offered his own general assessment of his
judicial appointments of the previous four years.
I
promised that I would appoint judges to the federal courts
and particularly the Supreme Court who would recognize that
the first civil right of every American is to be free from
domestic violence.
I
am proud of the appointments I have made to the courts
and particularly proud of those I have made to the Supreme
Court of the United States.'

Nixon had reason to be proud of his Supreme Court appointments,
for in the face of the most stubborn Senatorial opposition to Presidential

court nominations in this century, he had succeeded in placing four

judicial

"conservatives" on the high Court.

It is not clear from this statement, however, whether Nixon was less

proud of his lower court appointments or merely unaware of or unconcerned

with their performance.

Perhaps though his statement reflects his

^New York Times, August 24, 1972,

P-

^7.

^Prior to the Senate's rejection of both Clement Haynsworth and
Harrold Carswell and the 1968 proposed elevation of Abe Fortas to the
Chief Justiceship, only 1930 Hoover nominee, John Parker, failed to gain
Senate confirmation in this century.
G.
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awareness of the declining power and
involvement of the President personally in the selection process at the lower
levels of the federal

judiciary.

One of the ironies of the judicial selection
process it seems
that the Senate Judiciary Committee and sometimes
the Senate as

a

is

whole,

make

a

tial

appointments to the Supreme Court but with only rare
exceptions,

genuine effort to investigate and sometimes to
challenge Presiden-

not to the lower federal courts,

^

yet the President is perhaps more likely

to get his way with the Supreme Court than with the
district and circuit

courts, where the choices of individual Senators may prevail.

probably due to

a

This is

number of factors including the perceived lack of impor-

tance of lower courts by both President and Senators, the unwillingness
of

either institution to devote significant resources to lower court appoint-

ments and consequently the growth of unwritten rules which assign the
lower court appointment prerogative to individual Senators.^

A further

irony is that Presidents may find that they have greater freedom of choice'
at the lower court level when facing

a

hostile Congress dominated by the

opposition party because real Congressional veto power over judicial
appointments is lodged in the hands of individual Senators of the President's party--the fewer of these Senators the President must contend with
3

Joel Grossinan, Lawyers and Judges:
The A.B.A. and the Politics
of Judicial Selection
(New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp.
170-1.
,

^Ibid.

,

p.

122.
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the greater his latitude in making lower
court appointments.^

Despite formidable constraints on the
President's appointment
power at the lower levels of the federal
judiciary, there is no reason to

cbnclude that the executive branch has little
influence on their selection.

The thrust of recent studies by Chase, ^ Goldman, 7
and Grossman,^

among others, is that the Justice Department, and
particularly the

Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General, play

a

positive and perhaps

dominant part in the selection of lower federal judges,
particularly those
to the circuit courts.^

Typically, argues Goldman, appointing administrations face two
types of situations:

(1)

where one or both Senators from the state from

which the appointee will be selected belong to the President's party; and
(2) where both Senators belong to the opposition party.

In the latter

situation, "justice officials can select their own candidate and can

ordinarily secure 'clearance' for that candidate. "^^

In the first situation

^For example, Kennedy was able to appoint eight judges in New York
without Senatorial consultation, acceding only to the wishes of Democratic
House Judiciary Committee chairman Emmanuel Cellar on one nominee. See
Victor iiavasky, Kennedy Justice (New York: Athenium, 1971), p. 264. By
contrast, Nixon was forced to delay some appointments in the second
circuit for over two years because of inability to reach agreement with
Republican Senator Jacob Javits.

Harold Chase, Federal Judges: The Appointing Process
University of Minnesota Press, 1972).
7

,

(Minneapolis:

Sheldon Goldman, "Judicial Appointments to the United States Courts
of Appeals," Wisconsin Law Review , LXVII, no. 1 (Winter, 1967), pp. 186-214.
o

Grossman, Lo c. Cit.
^

Ibid

.,

p. 122.

"•^Goldman, Loc.

Cit.

,

p.

213.
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where Senatorial courtesy may be
invoked, the administration has
several
options for securing appointments over
the opposition of an in-party

Senator:

It may avoid the invocation
of courtesy by appointing its man

to a judgeship outside the recalcitrant
Senator's state or region, for

instance to

a

judgeship in the Washington,

D.

C.

circuit.

Or it may

appoint judges to recess appointments which do
not require confirmation,
and then use the judge's record of successful
interim service to lobby

for Senate confirmation to

life term.

a

Or it may delay appointing any-

one at all to vacant judicial posts and rely on an
accumulation of

pressures from local press and bar associations to force
Senatorial
compromise.''^

Or it may arrange "package deals" to secure the
appoint-

ment of preferred candidates.
In effect, writes Grossman,
a

the appointing administration "occupies

controlling position" in the selection of lower federal court judges.

Ehe Attorney GeneraTI may not be able to engineer a nomination
over the adamant opposition of an "in-party" Senator, but. ..he
can generate sufficient pressure on a Senator to achieve a
workable compromise. .Sometimes the price will be prohibitive
and he will have to approve a nomination that he dislikes.
But
he cannot afford to have such instances be more than exceptions.
.

^

^'^

flew York Times
Feb. 7, 1971, p. 69.
According to the Times
the Nixon Administration delayed for two years the appointment of
judges to some vacancies on the second circuit because of its
inability to reach an accord with Jacob davits, the liberal Republican
Senator from Mew York.
"I

,

'Chase, loc. cit.
some detail

in part

I

13 Grossman, Op.

Chase discussed administration options in
of his book.
cit.

,

p.

122,

^
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The Role of the American Bar
Association

One impetus for

a

positive administration
role in the appointment

process other than its own policy
or patronage interests,

is

the active,

critical role of the American Bar
Association's Committee on Federal
Judiciary which has in recent years
exercised a quasi-official role
in
the initial investigatory stages of
the selection process.
By screening
potential nominees and passing on their
qualifications, the American

Bar Association is both

goad to an administration that
wishes to avoid

a

adverse publicity on the quality of its
appointments,

and also

a

potential source of leverage and support for
administrations in conflict

with Senators from their own party J
The A.B.A.

is

also

a

potential source of trouble for administra-

tions with distinct policy and patronage interests.

The political and

philosophical leanings of the A.B.A. toward the
Republican Party are well
known,

""^

and it was during the Eisenhower Presidency that
the Committee

on Federal Judiciary of the A.B.A. first attained
a secure role in the

selection process, exercising an informal veto over lower
court nominations and securing an election pledge from 1960 Presidential
candidate

Nixon to implement "non-partisan" judicial selection.^''

The Democrats,

on the other hand, could never appear to be "captive" of the
A.B.A., and

both Kennedy and Johnson refused to grant

^

^Ibid .,

^^ Ibid
^^

p.

80.

.

Ibid ., p. 80.

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

77-8.

a

veto power to the A.B.A. or
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pledge themselves to bipartisan or
non-partisan judicial selection.^^
However, Democrats have utilized the
investigatory, advisory and publicity

functions of the A.B.A.

President-elect Nixon's relationship with the
A.B.A. was marked by
ambivalence.

Nixon became the first President to
declare publicly that

he would not appoint a lower court judge who
had been deemed unqualified
by the A.B.A., 19

then refused to submit the names of Supreme
Court

nominees for even preliminary screening after the A.B.A.
"shot down" his

prospective nominations of Mildred Lilly, Richard Poff, and
Herschel Friday
prior to the eventual naming of Lewis Powell and William
Rehnquist.^^
Factors influencing administration choices

freedom of choice, which

is

Given the relative

.

even more pronounced with circuit than with

district judges, what factors influence the President's choices of lower
court judges?

More specifically, of what importance are questions of the

judge's ideological and policy viewpoints on his eventual selection?
Goldman's study of Eisenhower and Kennedy appointments led him to

conclude that considerations of "quasi-ideology" came into play along with

considerations of strengthening
legal competence.

a

circuit, making party leaders happy, and

However, political rather than legal or ideological

factors seemed most important:
On balance it seems that the candidate^ quasi-ideological viewpoint or his position on specific policy areas occasionally plays
a decisive role in the appointment process... it is probably an
inarticulate force operating to favor 'our kind,' other things

^^Chase, Op. cit.
^^

New York Times

,

,

p.

74.

February

7,

1972, p.

69.

^^Elizabeth Drew, "The Nixon Court," Atlantic
(November, 1972), p. 10.

,

CCXXX, no.

5,
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being equal.
However, because quasi-ideology and
specific
policy areas... do not usually explicitly concern
the political actors involved in the process,
quasi-ideology and
specific policy views are not pronounced features
of the
selection process.^'
However, both Goldman and Chase, who had access to
Justice Depart-

ment files, found evidence that the Kennedy and Eisenhower
Administrations had checked the policy views of candidates on specific
issues in

addition to "our kind" considerations of
liberal orientation.

a

general conservative or

The Eisenhower Administration was particularly

alert to the law and order views of specific nominees and were "apparently
seeking to pick men who took

a

jaundiced view of the Supreme Court's

decisions in that field, particularly the decision in the Mallory case..."^^
Similarly, Goldman found the Kennedy Administration officials had checked
the racial segregation views of all six of its nominees to the southern
(fifth) circuit.

Apparently the Law and order views of judges were

a

concern of both

the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, but this and the check on
racial views in the Kennedy era were exceptions.

According to Goldman,

the Justice Department has organizational needs that would lead it to

avoid those potential nominees with an anti-prosecution bias.

^^Goldman, Op. cit.

,

p.

This

211.

^^chase, Op. cit., pp. 104-5.

Navasky offers an excellent
Goldman, O p. cit.
pp. 210-11.
account of how the Kennedy Administration, through inexperience, faulty
intelligence, and the politics of the judicial selection process, came
to appoint five fervent segregationists to district and circuit
judgeships in the South at a time when the Justice Department was
committed to promoting civil rights through litigation. See Victor
Navasky, Op. cit ., Chapter V.
,
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presents few problems to

a

"right
fiyni: of
.An.^
.
oT rpntor"
center administration
such as that
•

of Eisenhower or Nixon, but
an internal schism in
"left of centeradministrations such as Kennedy's or
Johnson's. 24
This is not to suggest that
policy views of prospective
nominees
were the decisive factor in their
eventual selection.
Goldman's comparison of the voting behavior of
Kennedy and Eisenhower nominees
on criminal
procedures issues revealed no statistically
significant differences

between the two groups. ^5

Moreover, Kennedy appointees to
the southern

circuit were generally very conservative
on racial issues despite the

administration's check on their views.
Nevertheless, the Nixon Administration professed

a

singular deter-

mination to change court policy on the law and
order issues.

No scholar has

yet published research on judicial selection during
the Nixon Administration based on access to Justice Department files.

However, it would appear

from the studies already done of the powers and
limitations of appointing administrations that

a

sufficiently determined administration could

secure the appointment of particular ideological types
to the lower
courts and block others.

remains somewhat of

a

court appointments?

Ibid

.

jhus Nixon's 1972 convention statement

mystery.

Was he less than pleased with his lower

Were policy views and ideological considerations

209-10.

25

Sheldon Goldman, "Voting Behavior on the United States Courts
of Appeals, 1961-64," American
Political Science Review, LX, no. 2,
"
(June, 1966), p. 381.

~

New York Times February 7, 1971, p. 69. According to the
New Y o rk Times
the Nixon Administration rejected liberal New Jersey
Senator Clifford Case's nomination to the third circuit of aide
Clyde Ferguson, a black, because the latter was "soft" on crime.
,

,
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a

significant aspect of the appointment process
for the lower courts

during Nixon's term of office?

Did his appointees perform unexpectedly

once on the courts?
Chase, whose research into judicial selection
did not include the

Nixon Administration, wrote that
...the dynamics of judicial selection are such that
administrations which are basically concerned with
making
appointments of high quality will choose the same kinds
of
people for the same kinds of reasons whatever goals
and
standards they articulate. .. "2/

Two sources of information as to whether or not Nixon varied
considerably

from the appointment practices of his predecessors would lie
in the

voting behavior of his appointees on the bench and in their biographical
characteristics.

The remainder of this chapter will focus on the bio-

graphical characteristics of Nixon appointees.

Succeeding chapters will

focus on their actual behavior.

Background characteristics of United States Circuit Court judges:

Eisenhower to Nixon.

Goldman has been the most assiduous collector of

biographical information concerning United States Circuit Court judges.
This information has been published in two articles comparing first the

Eisenhower and Kennedy appointments to the Courts of Appeals,

*^

and

00

second, the Johnson and Nixon appointees to those courts.

^hhase.

Op.

cit.

,

p.

As the

185.

Sheldon Goldman, "Characteristics of Eisenhower and Kennedy
Appointments to the Lower Federal Courts," in Sheldon Goldman and
Thomas Jahnige, The Federal Judicial System (New York: Holt, Rinehart,
and Winston, 1969), pp. 25-30.
,

^^Sheldcn Goldman, "Johnson and Nixon Appointees to the Lower
Some Socio-Pol i tical Perspectives," Journal o f
Federal Courts:
Politics XXXIV, no. 2 (1972), pp. 934-942.
,
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Eisenhower appointees exhaust the bulk of
non-Nixon Republican appointees
now serving on the Circuit Courts, and
the Johnson-Kennedy appointees

similarly account for most non-Nixon Democratic
judges on the Courts of
Appeals, these articles provide an approximate
biographical profile of
the three groups (i.e., Nixon appointees,
non-Nixon Democrats and non-

Nixon Republicans) being compared in this study.

According to Goldman's

data, the Nixon appointments differed from the
Eisenhower and Johnson-

Kennedy appointments in some of the following ways:

(1)

Eighty percent

of the Eisenhower appointees were Protestant as compared
to 73.5 percent

of the Nixon appointees and 62.2 percent of the Kennedy-Johnson
appoinThus Protestants dominate the judicial selections of all three

tees.

groups.

Goldman also found Protestantism to be significantly correlated

with pro-prosecution voting behavior on criminal procedures issues.
(2)

Fifty percent of the Nixon appointees to

th^-

Courts of Appeals had

prior judicial experience as compared to 55.6 percent of the Eisenhower

appointees and 59.2 percent of the Johnson and Kennedy appointees.

(3)

17.6 percent of the Nixon appointees had been candidates for or elected
to political office as compared to 19.9 percent of the Kennedy-Johnson

appointees and 20 percent of the Eisenhower appointees.

However, Goldman

also found that Nixon appointees had more extensive political backgrounds
than had Eisenhower appointees when other types of political experience

were considered.

He found that in this respect the Nixon appointees

were more like prior Democratic nominees, particularly those from the
Kennedy Administration.

(4)

50.1

percent of Nixon appointees had prior

prosecutorial experience as compared to 47.1 percent of Johnson appointees

(no information collected on Eisenhower and Kennedy appointees
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in this

regard).

Goldman comments that

Goldman also found that the "majority
of both Johnson and Nixon
appointees had attended private or ivy
league law schools." The same
was true for Kennedy and Eisenhower
appointees, 66.7 percent of each
(5)

group attending the more expensive private
institutions,
indication of social class origin.

(6)

a

possible

Finally, 29.1 percent of

Nixon appointees as compared to 22.2 percent
of Eisenhower appointees
and 19.9 percent of Kennedy-Johnson appointees
were members of large

(five or more members) law firms prior-to
their appointment to judicial

office.

Such

a

background, according to Goldman,

is

also likely to-be

associated with higher socio-economic status.
Goldman's figures underline the essential similarity
of the three
groups.

He suggests that Republican appointees, whether
of Nixon or

Eisenhower, "tended to come from

Democratic appointees."

a

higher socio-economic stratum

than

However, he also stresses that most judges of

both parties were solidly rooted in the "middle class" with most

mobility confined to movement within that class.
Thus there is little in the biographical data to suggest that

Nixon appointees, so similar to prior appointees of other administrations,

would revolutionize judicial policy on law and order.

However, previous

students engaged in aggregate research have found only the slimmest links

between selected biographical characteristics of judges and their

^^ibid., pp. 941-2.
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behavior on the court.

Moreover, despite the "surface"
similarity of

the three groups, the "screening" process
purportedly conducted by the

Nixon Administration could still have resulted
in the selection of

a

distinctively "conservative" group of judges on
"law and order" issues.
The next chapter will compare the voting behavior
of Nixon appointees
with non-Nixon Democrats and Republicans in an
attempt to measure
the impact of the Nixon appointees on the disposition
of

appeals in fiscal 1973.

criminal

The following chapter will focus exclusively

on non-unanimous cases decided during the period fiscal
1970 to 1973
in order to see if any observed differences in voting
behavior can be

traced to attitudinal cleavages between and within the judge groups

being studied.

CHAPTER III
THE IMPACT OF THE NIXON APPOINTEES TO THE UNITED
STATES

COURTS OF APPEALS:

A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF

THE DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

DURING FISCAL 1973

Analysis of the previous two chapters suggests that the Nixon

Administration possessed both the will and the opportunity to appoint
a

more "conservative" group of judges to the Courts of Appeals.

by fiscal

Moreover,

1973, the Administration had already appointed thirty-seven of

what was eventually to be forty- three appeals court judges.

This

chapter will attempt to determine what difference, if any, those appointments made in the disposition of criminal appeals during the fiscal 1973 term
of those courts.
As indicated in Table I, the eleven circuits of the United States

Courts of Appeals decided 1572 cases involving "blue collar" crimes during
the fiscal 1973 term.

Eleven hundred forty-six of these cases were decided

against the criminal defendant or prisoner and only 366 were decided in his
In sixty-one cases,

favor.

the Courts of Appeals granted but also rejected

substantial aspects of defendant and prisoner claims as also can be seen in

Table

I.

If the numerical

values previously discussed are assigned to

these voting choices, one arrives at

possible range of

0

a

composite score of .50 out of

to 2.00 for the circuits taken as

a

whole.

a

Of these

1572 cases. 111 or approximately seven percent were decided non-unanimously.

Of the 111 non-unanimous decisions, 59 were decided against and 52 for the
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defendant, producing

a

score of .94.

Of the 1462 unanimously decided

cases, 1086 were decided against and 314 for
the criminal defendant with
61

decisions in between resulting in

that the chances of

a

a

score of. 47.

Table

I

suggests

decision being favorable to the criminal
defendant

were greatest when the court was non-unanimous;
however, even the prodefendant decisions were for the most part unanimously
decided.
Viewed in another way the United States Courts of Appeals
in fiscal
1973, if one excludes the sixty-one cases in which the panels took
inter-

mediate positions, ruled for the accused person or prisoner twenty-four
percent of the time or about one case in four.^

The more even division

of the non-unanimous cases, whereby the panels decided 47 percent of the
cases in favor of the accused person or prisoner, suggests that many of

these cases may allow more opportunity for judicial discretion.

Although this may seem like a high rate of failure on the part of
state and federal prosecutors and might suggest a significant impact on
societal safety, it should be remembered that the federal government and
many state governments negotiate guilty pleas in over ninety percent of
cases scheduled for trial, and that these pleas are rarely appealed.
Moreover, successful appeals of guilty pleas are even rarer, partly due
perhaps to the Supreme Court's reluctance to review pleas based on
advice of counsel. Of the ten percent of federal cases which do go to
trail and result in a conviction, only one in five are appealed despite
the guaranteed right to do so and liberalized policies to aid the poor
Finally, of those appellate decisions
in carrying out such actions.
which favored the accused a very small proportion directed a verdict of
Usually the accused
acquittal or mandated a dismissal of the indictment.
received no more than the right to a new trial or hearing, the outcome
of which was not known to this researcher.

.

.
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TABLE

I

DISPOSITION OF UNANIMOUS AND
NON-UNANIMOUS
RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS' CASES
BY ALL CIRCUITS DURING FISCAL
1973

Un an.

#

Pro-Def

Inter.

Total
Cases

Non- Unan.

%

314

(24)

61

(4)

#

52

%

(47)

% Unan.

%

366

(23)

86

61

(4)

100

Anti-Def

1086

(74)

59

(53)

1145

(73)

95

Total Cases

1461

(100)

111

(100)

1572

(100)

93

Score

.47

.94

.50

.
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Analysis of Individual Circuits

The hypothesis that Nixon appointees
would vote as if they were

more "conservative" than either non-Nixon
Republicans or non-Nixon
Democrats, 2 was supported by the composite
scores in six of the eleven

circuits when they were examined separately,
as shown in Table

2.

In

five other circuits (the second, fourth, sixth,
eighth, and tenth),

Nixon appointees had higher composite scores than
one of the other two

judge groups.

However, in no circuit did the Nixon appointees have
the

highest composite score of the groups.

In contrast,

non-Nixon Republi-

cans scored highest in five of the eleven circuits (the first,
third,

fourth, fifth, and tenth), and non-Nixon Democrats had the highest

composite score in six cir:,uits (the second, sixth, seventh, eighth,
ninth, and District of Columbia).

Six circuits

(the second,

third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and District

of Columbia) were of particular interest for reasons explained earlier

and are now examined in more detail.

Tables 3-7 present the scores for

each judge group on eight categories of cases previously described.

These scores were computed on
Scores were not computed for
if they cast less

a

a

minimum of ten votes for each judge group,
group on

a

particular category of cases

than ten votes in those types of cases.

2Th roughout the rest of this paper, non-Nixon Democrats and nonNixon Republicans will be referred to simply as Democrats and
Republ icans
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TABLE

2

COMPOSITE SCORES FOR JUDGE GROUPS BY
CIRCUIT

Cnmnn<;

i

Score

Circuit

Demorrfl

tp

Compos i te
Score
KepuD 1 cans
1

Compos i te
Score
Nixon Appointees

1

.26

.44

.24

2

.59

.44

.50

3

.51

.61

.42

4

.52

.67

.56

5

.56

.68

.41

6

.73

.52

.66

7

.74

.64

.60

8

.48

.20

.46

9

.70

.36

.28

10

.45

.57

.54

D.C.

.87

.48

Aggregate
Compos i te
Scores

.60

.51

.43
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Ih^.DMricjL^^^
is

The District of Columbia Circuit

particularly important to this study
because the appointing administra-

tion has maximum freedom from party and
regional pressures and also

because its location in the nation's capital
warrants special attention
from the appointing administration.

Circuit

is

Therefore, the District of Columbia

likely to reflect accurately the character of
the appointing

administration.

As only one non-Nixon Republican was involved
in the

voting (and he cast only four votes), this analysis
was confined to

a

discussion of the Nixon appointees and non-Nixon Democrats
on the circuit.
Moreover, the circuit hears only federal cases and there was no
opportunity to compare the judges on their disposition of state cases.

Table

3

Thus

presents the scores for only seven of the eight categories.

In fiscal

1973, the District of Columbia was the second most

liberal circuit and had the highest rate of conflict of all the circuits

(twenty percent of its cases were decided by non-unanimous votes).

The

District of Columbia Circuit was also notable because of the significant
gap between the composite scores of Nixon appointees (.48) and Democrats
(.87).

The differential of .39 was exceeded only in the ninth circuit

(discussed later).
by Table 3,

Considering

only non-unanimous cases, as indicated

the difference between the two groups grew to 1.00 as Demo-

crats scored 1.33 as compared to .33 scored by Nixon appointees.

More-

over, Nixon appointees failed to cast even one of fifteen votes for

criminal defendants in cases involving search and seizure and confession
issues, whereas Democrats scores

two categories.

.62 when one combines the votes for the

On cases not involving the search and confession issues,

the difference between the two groups shrunk to .35.

It would appear.
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therefore, that administration freedom
from considerations of Senatorial

courtesy has, as with the Supreme
Court, resulted in

a

sharp split

between Nixon appointees to the District
of Columbia Circuit and appoin,

tees from previous Democratic administrations.

The fifth circuit.
for several reasons.
totals.

The fifth circuit is important to
this study

First, its size has had an impact
on the aggregate

The fifth circuit in fiscal 1973 decided 459
cases, almost one

third of all blue collar criminal cases decided by
the United States

Circuit Courts of Appeals that fiscal year.

Second, the geographic

location of the fifth circuit in the deep South and its long
(recently
ended) history of one-partyism with the consequent regional
domination
by conservative Congressional Democrats has made it more difficult
for

the typical more liberal Democratic appointments to be made to the fifth

circuit.

Kenneth Vines' study of the fifth circuit found that Democratic

appointees to the Federal District Courts of the fifth circuit were more

"conservative" than Republican appointees to those courts in race
relations cases.

^

He explained that the closer ties of Democrats to the

conservative southern social structure resulted in their greater
"conservatism" relative to Republican appointees.

mention it as

a

Although Vines did not

source of Republican "liberalism" on race issues in this

region, Republican Presidents historically could avoid the obstacle of

Senatorial courtesy in appointments to the southern circuits.

Thus the

fifth circuit like the District of Columbia circuit normally maximizes
the freedom of Republican Presidents in the appointment process and

3

Kenneth Vines, "Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases
in the South," Journal of Politics , XXVI, No. 3 (1964), p. 350.
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serves as another excellent test of
Presidential intentions."^
The results of the voting in the
fifth circuit were dramatic.

Republicans scored .68, their highest
score in any circuit.
.scored .56.

Nixon appointees, however, scored only
.41.

Democrats

Thus southern

non-Nixon Republicans, as in Vines' study of
race relations cases, were

more liberal on criminal procedures cases
than Democrats and notably

more liberal

(differential of .27) than Nixon appointees.

This pattern

is magnified in the non-unanimous cases where
Republicans scored 1.29 on

seventeen votes as compared to .88 for Democrats and .52
for Nixon
appointees.

The only exception to

this,

pattern occurred in the confes-

sion cases where Republicans scored only .07 (casting 14 of
15 votes

against the crimi-nal defendant and taking an intermediate position in
the other) in confession cases as compared to .19 for Nixon appointees

and .32 for Democrats.

The lower score of the three Republican judges

on confession cases is perhaps attributable to the fact that the most

conservative of the three (Judge Brown) cast nine of the fifteen votes,
whereas the most liberal

(Judge Tuttle) cast only one vote.^

All

three

groups were considerably more lenient toward accused persons and prisoners in state than in federal

circuit.

cases,

a

pattern repeated in almost every

Republicans, Democrats and Nixon appointees scored .97, .83,

and .63 respectively in state cases, as compared to .51,
in federal

.42, and

.31

cases, as shown in Table 4.

^Conservative Republicans such as Tower of Texas and Gurney of
Florida would pose no obstacle to Nixon Administration policies on
criminal procedures.
^On the basis of voting in non-unanimous cases over the four-year
period 1970-73, Judge Tuttle scored 1.80, Judge Wisdom 1.30, and
Judge Brown .92.

.
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TABLE

3

COMPOSITE SCORE BY ISSUE CATEGORY:
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Judge
Group

#

Judges

Dem.

8

Rep.

1

Search
& Seize
Cases

other
Unan.
Cases

NonUnan.
Cases

All

Crim.
Cases

.00

.43

.94

.68

1.33

.87

.00

.00

.59

.53

.33

Confess
Cases

1

Crim.
Cases

Nixon
App.

3

.48

TABLE 4

COMPOSITE SCORES BY ISSUE CATEGORY:
FIFTH CIRCUIT

Other

Judge
Group

Cases

Crim.
Confessions

Non-unan.

Number

of Judges

Search

Score

Score

State Cases

Score

Score

Score

Score
Crim.

Fed.

Score

Cases

Unan.

All

Dem.

10

.42

.83

.32

.44

.60

.52

.88

.56

Rep.

4

.51

.97

.07

.21

.76

.63

1.29

.68

Nix

4

.31

.63

.19

.29

.45

.37

.52

.41
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The fourth,arcuit.

The patterns in the fifth
circuit were largely

repeated in the other southern circuit,
the fourth.

Republicans with a

composite score of (.67) were again
the most liberal group although
Democrats (.52) replaced Nixon
appointees (.56) as the most conservative
group.
There were too few cases for
comparison of the judge groups on
search and seizure and confession
cases and non-unanimous cases.

As for

the federalism issue, Nixon appointees
were the only group more conserva-

tive on state than on federal cases scoring
.42 on the first and .65 on
the latter.

Democrats, on the other hand, scored

.49 on federal

cases.

to only .53 on federal

.61

on state cases and

Republicans scored 1.00 on state cases as compared
cases.

The ninth circuit.

The ninth, or far western circuit, like the

fifth, is important because of the large number of
criminal procedures

cases it decided, 319 in fiscal
all

1973 or approximately twenty percent of

criminal cases decided in the Courts of Appeals during that
fiscal

year.

Together, the fifth and ninth circuits cecided over half of all

cases heard by the United States Courts of Appeals in fiscal 1973.

The

ninth circuit is also important to this study because of Goldman's earlier

finding that "criminal procedures cases were important sources of con-

flict for the ninth circuit."^
As in the fifth circuit, the results were dramatic.

As indicated

by Table 5, Democrats scored .70, Republicans .36, and Nixon appointees
.28.

The gap of .42 between the most liberal and most conservative

groups was the largest of any circuit.

When only non-unanimous cases

^Sheldon Goldman, "Conflict on the United States Courts of Appeals
1965-71:
A Quantitative Analysis," Cincinatti Law Review XXXXII, no. 4
(1973), p. 641.
,
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are considered the difference between
Democrats 1.64 and Nixon appointees
(.14) is magnified to 1.50, again the greatest
gap between any two groups

of judges on any circuit in the courts
of appeals.
Avas

particularly divisive.

Democrats scored 1.23

both Republicans and Nixon appointees.

The confession issue
as compared to

.00 for

The federalism issue did not,

however, divide the groups as dramatically as
all three were much more
liberal on state than on federal cases,

circuits, as can be seen in Table

a

common pattern for all the

5.

The second and third circuits

.

In contrast to the circuits which

maximized Nixon administration freedom from considerations of
Senatorial
courtesy, the second and third circuits were both scenes of conflict
over- administration preferences and Senatorial

prererogatives as the

Nixon administration quarreled with liberal Republican Senators
Jacob JaVits and Clifford Case.

Considering first the overall totals,

Nixon appointees to the third circuit scored lower (.42 composite score)
than Republican appointees of earlier administrations who scored

also scored lower than Democrats who scored .51.

.61

and

Considering the fact

that the Nixon administration made five appointments to the third circuit,
these results seem to portend

a

swing to the right in that circuit on at

least the criminal cases.
In the second circuit Nixon appointees scored slightly higher

(composite score. 50) than other Republican appointees (.44) and lower
than the Democrats who scored .59.

Thus when one views the cases as a

whole. Senatorial courtesy does not appear to have been

a

serious obstacle

to the Nixon administration's appointment of "conservative" judges in

the third circuit although his appointments were slightly more "liberal"
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in the second circuit as can
be seen from Table 6.

On the non-unanimous cases,
however, if one combines the
votes of

the judge groups in the two circuits,
as seen in the last column
of
,

Table
1.31

7,

Nixon appointees emerge as the most
"liberal" group, scoring

on 29 votes as compared to 1.20 for
Democrats (30 votes) and only

.84 for Republicans

(15 votes).

The situation is reversed, however, if one
looks only at unanimously

decided cases.

Then Nixon appointees are the most
"conservative" group

in each circuit scoring only .36 in the third
and .37 in the second.

Republicans are the most "liberal" group in the third
circuit on the
basis of votes in unanimously decided cases (.53), and
Democrats are the

most "liberal" group in the second circuit in such cases

(.49)..

Thus Senatorial courtesy appears to be an important check on

administration preferences in the second and third circuits only if one
ignores the unanimously decided cases and regards only the non-unanimously

decided cases as valid indicators of judicial attitudes and voting
tendencies.

'
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TABLE

5

COMPOSITE SCORES BY ISSUE CATEGORYNINTH CIRCUIT

Cases

&

Cases

Crim.

Judges
zure

Crim.

Confession

Judge
Group

Dem.

Score

7

Nixon App.

6

Score

State

Search

Score

Sei

Fed.

of

6

Rep.

Non-unan.

Number

Other

Cases
Cases

Unan.

All

.64

.82

1

.23

.62

.66

.60

1

.64

.70

.30

.48

.00

.47

.33

.31

1.14

.36

.24

.55

.00

.25

.29

.28

.14

.28

TABLE

6

COMPOSITE SCORE BY ISSUE CATEGORY:
SECOND CIRCUIT

Judge
Group

Judges

Unan.
Cases

Dem.

5*

.49

1.33

.59

Rep.

6

.41

.77

.44

Nixon App.

4

.37

1.82

#

Non-unan.
Cases

Democratic group includes one Liberal

(Hayes)

All Crim.

Cases

.

.50
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TABLE

7

COMPOSITE SCORE BY ISSUE CATEGORYTHIRD CIRCUIT

Judge
Group

#

Judges

Unan.
Cases

N-Unan.
Cases

Cases

N-Unan.
Cases 2d &
3d Circ.
Combined

All
Crim,

Dem.

8

.45

1.00

.51

1.20

Rep.

2

.53

1.00

.61

.84

Nixon App.

5

.36

1.00

.42

1.31

Aggregate Analysis for Fiscal 1973

During fiscal

thirty-seven Nixon appointees to the United

1973,

States Courts of Appeals cast 1380 votes in criminal procedures cases for
a

composite score of .43.

for

a

In contrast, seventy Democrats cast 2190 votes

composite score of .60.

votes in fiscal 1973 for

Finally, thirty-four Republicans cast 872

composite score of .51.

a

Thus there is evidence

to support the hypothesis that Nixon appointees in the aggregate would be

more conservative than non-Nixon Republicans and non-Nixon Democrats.
The federalism issue

.

A striking aspect of the overall findings is

that all three groups of judges scored higher on the claims of state

rather than federal defendants.

The Democrats scored .76 on 537 votes

cast in state cases compared to .55 on 1613 cases appealed from the federal
level

for

a

difference in scores of .21.

.66 on 195 state cases and only .44 on 651

Similarly, Republicans scored
federal cases for

a

.22
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differential.

Nixon appointees scored .64 on
306 state cases as opposed

to .36 on 1056 federal

cases, for a differential of
.28.

Table 8

presents these results.
This was surprising.

It was expected that at least
Nixon appointees

and Republicans would score lower on
state prosecutions.

But the federal-

ism issue did not seem to divide the
judges in this manner.

It seems

likely that the more favorable treatment
given by all three groups to

offenders at the state level reflects the large
number of state cases in

which

state judge was overruled for dismissing

a

without

a

habeas corpus petition

a

hearing, although the difference may also reflect
lower standards

of due process at that level.
of it was not

a

In either case the

federalism issue or lack

significant factor in explaining the voting differences

observed between the three groups of judges.
The confession and search and seizure issues

three groups tended to take

a

.

Similarly, all

harsher position toward criminal defendants

in confession and search and seizure cases than in other criminal

cases.

As with the federalism issue, however, this difference may bo due to the

nature of some confession and search cases in which the appellate court
upheld

a

trial

judge's finding that disputed evidence was admissible.

These hearings within

a

trial

to determine admissibility of evidence are

more difficult for an accused to challenge because the state must only
prove

a

preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond

doubt as in the trial itself.

Table

9

a

reasonable

presents these comparisons.

However, the differences between the lowest scoring group (Nixon

appointees) and the highest scoring (Democrats) are slightly larger in
the search and confession cases than in the "all other criminal cases"
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category and the same

is

true when Democrats and
Republicans are compared.

Thus, unlike the federalism issue,
cases involving the confession
and
search and seizure issues do appear
to be somewhat more divisive
for

'Nixon appointees and Republicans on
the one hand and Democrats
on the

other.

Above all, however, the figures
portray

the part of all

a

marked reluctance on

three groups of judges to employ
the exclusionary rule

to throw out convictions based on
alleged coerced statements as compared
to their willingness to overturn
convictions based on other alleged

violations of due process.

It does not appear from the
quantitative

evidence, then, that Miranda and its progeny have
"thrown open prison
gates" if the voting behavior of United States
Appellate Court judges
is

indicative of judicial behavior in other "lower" courts.

'

TABLE 8

COMPOSITE SCORES FOR AGGREGATE JUDGE GROUPS:
FEDERAL AMD STATE CASES, FISCAL 1973

State

Judge
Group

Federal

#

Votes

Diff.

Scores

Votes

Scores

Scores

Dem.

537

.76

1613

.55

.21

Rep,

195

66

651

.44

.22

Nixon App.

305

,64

1056

36

.28

Diff. in
scores bet.
Dem. & Nix.
app.

12

19

in
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TABLE

9

^POSITE

SCORES FOR AGGREGATE JUDGE
GROUPSCOflFFSSinw
SEARCH AND "ALL OTHER CASES"
CATEGORIES FISCAL 1973

Judge
Group

Confession
Votes
Score

Search &
Seizure
Votes
Score

Dem.

108

370

.50

1672

,62

.19

130

.34

669

.53

.19

231

28

1061

,47

Rep.

47

Nix.

69

.39

All

Other
Criminal Cases
Votes
Score

Diff. in
scores bet.
Dem.
app.

& Nix.

20

22

Unanimous versus non-unanimously decided cases

.15

.

There were also,

as expected, sharper differences between the three major
groupings of

judges when the non-unanimous deicsions were treated separately from
the

unanimous decisions.

Republicans and

.61

Democrats scored 1.14 as compared to .96 for
for Nixon appointees.

In the unanimous cases. Demo-

crats scored .54 as contrasted to .47 for Republicans and .41 for Nixon

appointees.

Thus the scores of all three groups rise when only the non-

unanimous cases are considered with both Democrats and Republicans moving
into the moderate category.

The much greater difference between the

three groups on the non-unanimous as compared to the unanimous cases

suggests that the former cases may be the best indicators of the ideological predispositions of the judges.

On this particular measure, the
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Differences between the highest and
lowest scoring groups on unanimous
cases was only .13 but rose to .53 on
non-unanimous cases as can be

seen in Table 10.

TABLE 10

COMPOSITE SCORES FOR AGGREGATE JUDGE GROUPS:
UNANIMOUS
AND NON-UNANIMOUS CASES, FISCAL 1973*

NonUnanimous
Votes
Score

Judge
Group

Unanimous
Votes
Score

Difference

Median Score

Dem.

225

1.14

1965

.54

.60

.64

Rep.

73

.96

799

.47

.49

.48

Nix.

128

.61

1252

.41

.20

.46

Diff. in
scores bet.
Dem. & Nix.
app.

.53

.13

.18

*Includes all criminal cases

Categorizing individual judges

.

Another way of comparing the three

groups of judges is to compute the percentage of each group that falls
into the "liberal," "moderate," and "conservative" categories using

fifteen votes cast as
individual judge.

a

minimum number for purposes of classifying an

Thirty-four of thirty-five Nixon appointees who

satisfied this criterion fell into the "conservative" category with the
remaining one

a

"moderate."

The median score of the Nixon appointees

.
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was .46.

Of the Republicans
m-cns, 15
nf is
H
13 or
18 ,„t.,
with »u
the minimum number of votes
fell into the conservative
category and three were
classified as
•

•

moderates.

The median score for Republicans
was .48.

Finally, 32 of 46
Democrats were categorized as
conservative with 13 falling into
the

moderate group, and one, Skelly Wright
of the District of Columbia
Circuity
classified as a liberal. The median
score for Democrats was

be seen in Table

1 1

TABLE

n

PERCENTAGES OF JUDGE GROUPS IN "LIBERAL "
"MODERATE
AND "CONSERVATIVE" CATEGORIES
FISCAL 1973

Lib.

Democrat

Republ ican

#

U

%

1

.64. as can

Nixon Appointee

01
10

It

.02

#

Total

%

.00

#

"

(Lib., Mod. , Con.)
%

.00

=

1

(1%)

Mod.

13

.28

3

.14

1

.03

= 17

(17%)

Con.

32

.70

18

.86

34

.97

=84

(82%)

Total

46

100%

21

100%

35

00%

102

(100%)

1

\

Exclusion of the fourth and fifth circuits

.

As it has been argued

that the peculiar historical circumstances surrounding party politics in
the southern circuits may have distorted the combined results, aggregate

scores were computed which excluded the two southern circuits.

When these circuits were excluded, the Nixon appointees retained

almost the identical score (.43) as when these circuits were included.
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Democrats, on the other hand, moved
from .60 to .64 when the fourth
and
fifth circuits were excluded and
Republicans slipped from .51 to .43.
Thus the more "liberal" Republican
judges in the southern circuits
seem
,to

account for the observed differences
between the scores of Nixon

appointees and non-Nixon Republicans on
criminal procedures issues in
fiscal

1973.

See Table 12.

TABLE 12

IMPACT OF EXCLUDING THE FOURTH AND FIFTH CIRCUITS
ON COMPOSITE
GROUP SCORES FOR FISCAL 1973: ALL CASES

Judge
Group

All Circuits
Incl uded

4th & 5th Circuits

Excluded

Difference

Dem.

.60

.64

+ .04

Rep.

.51

.43

-.08

Nix.

.43

.43

.00

Diff. bet.
Dem. & Nix.
app.

.17

.21

The exclusion of the fourth and fifth circuits has

a

similar impact

on non-unanimous case scores although the Nixon appointees remain the

most conservative of the three groups, as can be seen in Table
appointees increased their score from

.61

to

.66.

13.

Nixon

Republican scores

dipped from .96 to .79 and scores for Democrats rose from 1.14 to 1.26.
Thus the gap between Nixon appointees and Democrats increases to .60

.
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outside the southern circuits and
the gap between Democrats
and Republicans
grows to .47 when the southern
circuits are excluded.

TABLE 13

IMPACT OF EXCLUDING FOURTH AND FIFTH
CIRCUITS ON COMPOSITE
JUDGE GROUP SCORES FOR FISCAL 1973NONUNANIMOUS CASES

Judge
Group

All

Circuits
Included

Dem.

1.14

Rep.

.96

4th & 5th Circuits
Included

Difference

1.26

+ .12

.79

-.17

+ .05

.

Nix.

.61

.66

Diff. bet.
Nix. ,& Dem.
appoi ntees

.53

.60

Finally, as one can see from Table 14 (as compared to Table 11),

excluding the fourth and fifth circuits increases the percentage of Democrats classified as "moderate," while reducing the percentage classified as

"conservative."

In contrast,

the effect on Republicans is to increase the

percentage categorized as "conservative" and decrease the percentage of
"moderates" until the Republicans as

a

group are almost identical to the

Nixon appointees who remain unchanged by the exclusion of the southern
circuits
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TABLE 14
IN "LIBERAL," MODERATE,"
AND

'
'''''™SsFL'T?Sp..^^?f
CONSERVATIVE" CATEGORIES

WHEN FOURTH AND
FIFTH CIRCUITS ARE EXCLUDED

Democrats
IT

Lib.

1

Mod.

Con.

Total

Republ icdns
lo

#

%

.03

Nixon Appointees
#

%

.00

.00

n

.34

20

.63

15

.94

29

.97

32

loo;^

16

100%

30

100%

1

.06

.03

1

Summary

The quantitative analysis of all criminal procedures cases
decided
during fiscal 1973 supported the expectation that Nixon appointees
would
cast

a

greater proportion of votes against the accused and prisoners than

either non-Nixon Democrats or non-Nixon Republicans when these groups were
taken in the aggregate.

This was true for all categories of cases

considered when measured by the composite scores of the three groups.
When, however, the focus was on individual circuits, the Nixon appointees

were the lowest scoring group in only six of the eleven circuits.

In

five other circuits (the second, fourth, sixth, eighth, and tenth), Nixon

appointees scored higher than or were equal to at least one of the other
groups.

However, as shown in Table 3, in no circuit did Nixon appointees

score higher than both other groups, in contrast to Democrats who scored
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highest in six circuits and
Republicans who scored highest
in five.
Of particular interest were
the high scores of non-Nixon
Republicans in the fourth and fifth
circuits.
It was observed that the
,

differences in the scores in all
blue collar criminal procedures
cases
between Republicans and Nixon appointees
could be accounted for by the

differences in voting behavior in the
fourth and fifth circuit.

When
these circuits were excluded there were
no differences in the scores

between the two Republican groups.

When only non-unanimous cases were

examined there were differences in the
three groups as expected, which
held up even when the southern circuits
were excluded.
It was also observed that the federalism
issue did not divide

the three groups of judges but that there was
some evidence that the

search and seizure and confession issues were more
divisive than other
types of criminal cases.

A more important finding with regard to the

latter issue were the much lower scores of all three
groups of judges on

confession issues as compared to search and seizure and the "all
other
criminal cases" categories, perhaps reflecting the degree to which
the

American judicial system has come to depend on self incrimination as
means of coping with

a

a

constantly expanding caseload or the greater

weakness of defendants' cases.

A particularly unexpected aspect of the

federalism issue was the more favorable treatment given to defendants
processed by the state than to those subject to the federal criminal

justice system, as it was thought that at least Nixon appointees and
Republicans might be less lenient than Democrats with regard to the
rights of state defendants, reflecting the greater concern of the

former two groups with "states rights."
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Finally, the aggregate figures,
based on all blue collar
criminal
cases, suggest an essential similarity
and "conservatism" of the
three
groups of judges.
Translated into percentage terms.
Democrats decided
'for the criminal defendant or
prisoner roughly thirty percent of
the
time as compared to twenty-five
percent for Republicans and twenty-one

percent for Nixon appointees.

The influx of Nixon appointees
then did

not constitute radical change when one
views the matter in such quan-

titative terms.
The similarity and "conservatism" of the
three groups might be

explained in one of two ways:

It could be argued that the dominant
role

of the Justice Department in the recruitment of
judges results in the

selection of prosecution orientated individuals no matter
which administration is in power.

On the other hand, many unanimously decided cases

(and some non-unanimously decided cases also) may represent
"frivolous"

defendant or prisoner appeals in

'the

sense that even "liberal" judges

have little choice but to reject them.

Therefore, the inclusion of

unanimously decided cases may distort the attitudinal characterization
of judges.

Recall from Table 10 that the difference between the compo-

site scores of the lowest (Nixon) and highest (Democrats) scoring groups
was only .13
(.61

all

(.41

to

.54) on unanimously decided cases but grew to .53

to 1.14) on the non-unanimously decided cases.

Recall further that

three groups of judges fell into the "conservative" classification on

unanimously decided cases but that both Democrats and Republicans rose
into the "moderate" category on non-unanimously decided cases, and that

Democrats as

a

group were in the "liberal" classification (1.26) on non-

unanimously decided cases when the southern circuits were excluded.

It
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is

possible then that the attitudinal
characterization of judges

Is .ost
for understanding conflict
(which admittedly Is rare;
approximately
one case in fourteen) on the courts
of appeals and that attitudinal

useful

characterizations based on unanimous
case scores are misleading.

It is

possible also that the identification
of judicial attitudes on the
courts of appeals is useful for explaining
only a limited aspect of
appeals court behavior.
In conclusion,

the Nixon appointees had some, but
not

a

radical,

impact on the aggregate disposition of criminal
appeals during fiscal
1973, an impact which varied considerably from
circuit to circuit.

The

next chapter will attempt to account for some of
the differences observed
by examining evidence of attitudinal cleavages
in the voting behavior

of the three judge groups.

Only non-unanimous cases will be used in

the following analysis because it can be assumed with
some certainty

that those cases presented opportunities for the exercise of
reasonable

judicial discretion.

CHAPTER
CONFLICT ON THE COURTS OF APPEALS:

IV
ATTITUDES. BACKGROUNDS

AND THE DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

IN NON-

UNANIMOUS CRIMINAL CASES FOR FISCAL 1970-73
The composite score used in Chapter Three as
the primary measure
of the "impact" of the Nixon appointees has two
serious shortcomings as
an indicator of the attitudinal characteristics of
the judges, the pri-

mary concern of this chapter:

First, it sometimes combines both unani-

mous and non-unanimous cases.

Second, it does not take into account

the fact that some judges cast more votes than others.

Thus the compo-

site score may distort measurement of the central attitudinal tendencies
of each of the three judge groups.

Therefore, this chapter will employ,

in addition to the composite score, a medians test, v/hich weighs all

judge scores equally no matter how many votes they cast.

In addition,

the analysis in this chapter will be confined almost completely to non-

unanimous cases where the exercise of judicial discretion can be

assumed with some confidence.
During the period July

1,

1969 to June 30, 1973, the United States

Courts of Appeals decided 530 non-unanimous cases involving the rights
of accused persons and prisoners.

Forty-five percent of these cases

were decided in favor of the accused, fifty-two percent were decided
against them with three percent falling in between.
to fiscal

This is in contrast

1973 (which included those decided unanimously) when only

twenty-three percent of the decisions were in favor of the accused or
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prisoner, as can be seen in Table
15.

Moreover, 49.7 percent of individual

votes favored the accused or
prisoner in the non-unanimous cases.

The

more equal division of votes and
decisions in non-unanimous cases
again
-suggests that non-unanimous cases may
contain more factual and legal ambi-

guities, thereby providing more frequent
opportunities than unanimous cases
for the exercise of a wide range of
discretion, and they may therefore
reveal more about judicial attitudes toward
the social and political issues

embodied in criminal cases.

TABLE 15

COMPARISON OF CASE DISPOSITION:

N-Unan. Cases
Fi seal

1970-73

Pro-Defendant

Intermed.

Anti-Defendant

45%

FISCAL 1973 AND FISCAL 1970-73

N-Unan. Cases
r4
1
3ua
1973 Only
1

All Cases
Fiscal
1973

1

47%

23%

-30/

O/o

52%

2%

53%

75%

Although, as was seen in the last chapter, aggregate analysis may

obscure important circuit differences, the major hypothesis of the study
that Nixon appointees would vote as if they were more "conservative" than

both non-Nixon Republicans and non-Nixon Democrats,

is

supported by the

aggregate data from non-unanimous cases for fiscal 1970-73.

This time,

however, the margins of difference between the three groups are greater,
as indicated by Table 16, column 2. Democrats score 1.18; and when voting
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in the fourth and fifth circuits
is excluded, Democrats
score 1.26 on nonunaniraously decided cases from
fiscal 1970-73, as can be
seen in the last

column of Table 16.
In contrast,

Republicans score .34 on the
non-unanimous cases and

Nixon appointees score .58.

When the southern circuits are
excluded, the

composite score for Republicans falls to
.73 on the non-unanimous cases
and the score of Nixon appointees
increases to .60.
So the exclusion of
the southern circuits again has the effect
of narrowing the difference

between the Nixon appointees and non-Nixon
Republicans, although this time
the latter group remains more "conservative,"
as can be seen in Table 16.

TABLE 16

COMPARISON OF COMPOSITE NON-UNANIMOUS CASE SCORE
FOR FISCAL 1970-73 WITH UNANIMOUS CASE SCORES
FOR FISCAL '75 BY JUDGE GROUP

Judge
Group

Score Non-unan.
4th & 5th Circ.
Excl uded

Score 1973
Unan. Cases

Score 1970-73
Non-Unan.

Differ-

Democrats

.54

1.18

+ .64

1.26

Republ icans

.47

.84

+ .37

.73

Nixon

.41

.58

+ .17

.60

Diff. between
Nixon App. &

.13

.60

.47

.66

ential

Dem.

in the last chapter, "Democrats" refers to non-Nixon
Democrats and "Republicans" refers to non-Nixon Republicans.

As

66

Classification of Individual Judges Based
on
Non-unanimous Case Votes

Classifying judges on the basis of scores
in at least six
unanimous cases results in

a

non-

wider "spread" of the judges among the

"liberal," moderate," and "conservative"
divisions than the earlier

classification, which was based primarily on votes
in unanimously

decided cases.

Whereas only one judge in the entire
population of

judges was classified as

a

"liberal" when the latter cases were used,

thirty-five judges or thirty-four percent of the judge
population are

classified as "liberal" when only non-unanimous cases were
considered.
The number of "moderates" remains about the same (17), but the
number of

"conservatives" is reduced from 84 to 43 when votes in non-unanimous cases
are used, as can be seen in Table 17.

Thus the criminal defendant has a

much better chance of encountering sympathetic judges in non-unanimous
cases, but still has

a

less than even chance of a favorable decision, as

the center of gravity remains in the "conservative" category.

Democrats, as expected, dominate the "liberal" grouping, twentyfive of the thirty-five judges classified as "liberal" being non-Nixon

Democrats.

In fact,

forty-four percent of non-Nixon Democrats fall into

the "liberal" category as compared to twenty-nine percent of the Republicans and eighteen percent of Nixon appointees.

place

a

Nixon appointees also

smaller percentage of judges in the "moderate" category than do

either of the other two groups, and place

a

much larger percentage of

judges in the "conservative" category than do Democrats and Republicans,
as can be seen from Table 18.

When the southern circuits are excluded, the net effect, as in
the last chapter (Table 14), is to narrow the difference between
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Republicans .nd Nixon appointees and
increase the distance between
these
two groups and the more "liberal
non-southern Democrats, as can be
seen
from Table 19.

TABLE 17

ATTITUDINAL CLASSIFICATION OF JUDGES:
COMPARISON OF
CLASSIFICATIONS BASED ON UNANIMOUS CASES
WITH CLASSIFICATIONS BASED ON
NON-UNANIMOUS CASES ONLY

All C ases
Fiscal 1973
#

%

Lib.

1

Mod.

Con.

Total

Only N-Unein. Cases
197()-73

Diffe rence

#

%

.01

35

.34

+34

+ .33

17

.17

22

.24

+ 5

+ .07

84

.84

43

.42

-41

-.42

102

100%

100

100%

#

%
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TABLE 18

PERCENTAGES OF JUDGE GROUPS IN "LIBERAL,"
"MODERATE
"CO.NSERVATIVE" CATEGORIES:
NON-UNANIMOUS
CASES, FISCAL 1970-73

Democrat
%

TT

25

.44

11

Con.

Total

Lib.

Mod.

Nixon
Appointee

Republ lean

"

AMD

Total "Lib,"
"Con," "Mod

%

#

%

6

.29

4

.18

35

(34%)

.19

7

.33

4

.18

22

(24%)

21

.37

8

.28

14

.64

43

(42%)

57

100.^

23

100%

22

100%

TABLE 19

PERCENTAGES OF JUDGE GROUPS IN "LIBERAL," "MODERATE," AND
"CONSERVATIVE" CATEGORIES, SOUTHERN CIRCUITS
EXCLUDED:
NON-UNANIMOUS CASES
FISCAL 1970-73

Democ rat

Republ ican

Nixo n
Appoin tee

Tot.al

0/
lO

#

%

#

%

#

%

Lib.

20

.49

3

.19

4

.21

27

36

Mod.

7

.17

5

.31

4

.21

16

21

Con.

14

.34

8

.50

n

.58

33

43

Total

41

100%

100%

19

100%

76

100%

16
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Analysis of Individual
Circuits
As in the preceding chapter,
the voting behavior of Nixon
appoin-

tees varies considerably from
circuit to circuit, and in only
four of
,the ten circuits analyzed
(there were insufficient votes
to include the

first circuit), the fourth, fifth,
ninth and District of Columbia,
are
Nixon appointees the most "conservative"
of the three judge groups.
In three other circuits,

tees are more liberal

the seventh, eighth, and tenth,
Nixon appoin-

than one other judge group and
in three circuits,

the second, third, and sixth, Nixon
appointees are more "liberal" than

both other groups of judges, as can be
seen in Table 20.

The four circuits in which Nixon appointees
were the most

"conservative" are the same circuits discussed in
detail in the analysis
of all cases for fiscal

1973.

These circuits, the fourth, fifth, ninth

and District of Columbia, were the ones in which
there was maximum Admini-

stration freedom from Senatorial constraints, thus
permitting the

appointment of appeals judges closest
tion.

in

ideology to the Nixon Administra-

The results suggest that it is this factor which accounts
for the

"conservative" voting behavior of Nixon appointees when compared to
other

judge groups in those circuits.
Similarly, two of the three circuits in which Nixon appointees

were the most liberal group, the second and third, are the two circuits
in which the Nixon Administration faced maximum publicized resistance.

This was particularly true of the second circuit where Nixon appointees

were clearly more "liberal" in their voting on non-unanimous cases than
were the other two groups.

i
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TABLE 20

COMPOSITE JUDGE GROUP SCORES BY
CIRCUITS:
NON-UNANIMOUSLY
DECIDED CASES, FISCAL 1970-73*

Circuit

Democrats+
#

Votes
Cast

c
o

o

75

Republ

cans

Nixon Appointees

#

Score

1.29

u.

n

Votes
Cast

79

Score

Score

Cast

.68

Co

1

.48

93

1.08

19

1.05

fin

76

.95

27

1.33

Q

.44

199

.90

44

1.23

33

.42

6

72

.88

12

.42

13

.92

7

78

1.26

19

•

8

71

1.18

30

.27

11

.55

9

167

.53

111

1.00

81

.33

10

25

.68

16

.31

11

.55

315

1.31

4

.00

103

.27

1171

1.18

361

.84

376

.58

1.10

/I

4
c

D

D.C.

Total

1

CO

T t-

First circuit excluded because of insufficient votes in nonunanimous cases.
"""Seventy-one Democrats cast votes in non-unanimous cases as
compared to thirty- three Republicans and thirty-six Nixon appointees.
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In order further to test the
potency of Senatorial

Courtesy as a

check on the Presidential appointment
power and better to account for
the observed circuit and individual
differences in the voting behavior

of Nixon apoointees, A.D.A. scores
were obtained for Republican Senators

eligible to veto Nixon appointments to the
courts.

"I

Nixon appointees

were then grouped into "liberal," "moderate,"
and "conservative"
categories on the basis of their votes on
non-unanimously decided cases
and average A.D.A. scores computed for the
Senators corresponding to each
of the three judge grouping.

Table

21

ranks and groups the Nixon appoin-

tees by score based on votes in at least six
non-unanimous cases and gives

the corresponding A.D.A. score for the Senator potentially
able to veto
his appointment.

In cases where there was no Republican Senator to

oppose the judicial nominee an A.D.A. score of .00 was assigned to indicate
the lack of Senatorial opposition to the nominee.

Although only twenty-two Nixon appointees cast enough

votes (6)

to be included in the analysis, there were significant differences between

the A.D.A. scores of Senators linked with the eight Nixon appointees who

scored in the "moderate" or "liberal" range and Senators associated with
the thirteen Nixon appointees in the "conservative" grouping, as Table 19

Applying Spearman's Rank-Difference Correlation to the date in

shows.

Table

21

produced

a

correlation coefficient of .42.^

When two Senators were in a position to veto a nomination, an
average A.D.A. score was computed for them. Each individual Senator's
A.D.A. score was computed on the basis of his performance in Congress over
the four-year period fiscal 1969-73.
2

Method described in Dorothy Adkins, Statistics (Columbus: Merrill,
1964), p. 282, and in Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics for the
Behavioral Sciences (New York:
McGraw Hill , 1956), p. 202.

.

.

s

1

.
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TABLE

21

COMPARISON OF SENATE A.D.A. SCORES
AND
JUDICIAL VOTING TENDENCIES*

1

Judge
Name

C 1 re

2

Oakes

KepuD Mean
Senator
Name(s)
'

Sta

^-

;

Vt.

^PM

Q

Kank

2 00

1

Ml Ken a

1

r

Mansfield N.Y.

2

1

.33

2 5

.44+

vJdVl LS

N.Y.
N.J.
Penn.

Penn.
N.J.

9

Adams
Hunter
Stevens
Wright

5

In'^raharr

7

Pell

Wash
Texas
Ind."

5

Roney
Sprecher
Ross

Fla.
111.
Neb.

Choy
Wil key
Robb
Clark
Brooks

Haw.

3
3

•

.33

2

1.30
1.17

4

1

Case
Srntt

5

3
7

7

8
9

Ill

1

.04
.00

6

.91

8

.73
.57
.53
.36
.33
.33

7

QOC
P p 1« cy
p \/
rer

.

.

1

oo
OC
nn
nn
nn

1

3
1

.

D

5.5
IP
o t;
D
.

1

1

P

R

IP
O. c
0
1

12

Gurney

14.5
14.5

20

9
9

Trask

.18

22

Neb.

1

"57

Tower

.20
.19

D.C.

Miss.
Kent.

8.5
8.5
1.5

"37

.0/

9

10

MacKinnon
Kilkenny Ore.

5

Q
CI

V/

14.5
14.5

6

1/
Is.

II

.33
.33
.32
.29
.29

D.C.
D.C.

4b

.45
.88
1

1

.

II

5

^rWvA/oi
Ji-ilWt:

3

10

&

1

Mulligan
Gibbons
Rosenn

Rank

routy

D u L K. ey
2

A.D.A.

•

Hruska &
Curtis
Fong

17

18.5
18.5

Cook &
Cooper

Packwood &
Hatfield
Goldwater &
Fannin

21

Spearman Rank Order Correlation

=

.07

13

uc

.03
.24

14
12

.00
.00
.00

18.5
18.5
18.5

.50
.00

18.5

7

.64

5

.02

15

.42

*Only Nixon appointees who cast at least six votes in non-unanimous
cases were included in this table.

+When there were two Senators from an appointee's state their A.D.A.
scores were averaged together.
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Even when the .00 A.D.A. scores
signifying the absence of Republican
Senators from the states of six
judicial appointees are excluded,
the

differences between the mean A.D.A.
score of Republican Senators
from
states that produced conservative
judges and the mean A.D.A. score
of

Republican Senators from states that
produced "liberal-moderate" judges
remains .36, as can be seen in Table 22.

TABLE 22

COMPARISON OF SENATE A.D.A. SCORES AND JUDICIAL
VOTING
TENDENCIES:
"LIBERAL" AND "MODERATE" CATEGORIES
COMBINED AND SIX JUDGES FROM STATES WITHOUT
REPUBLICAN SENATORS EXCLUDED

"Lib-Mod" Judge
Group

"Conservative"
Judge Group

Mean Senate
A.D.A. Score

.59

.15

Mean Senate
A.D.A. Score

.59

.27

Difference

.47

(6 judges

excluded)

.36

Finally, all six of the Nixon appointees not encumbered by consi-

derations of senatorial courtesy fall into the "conservative" grouping,

whereas three of the four "liberal" Nixon appointees come from states
that have the most liberal Senators.

Bloc analysis of individual circuits

.

Bloc analysis is

9

method

used to study collegial courts both in the United States and in other

countries.

The purpose of bloc analysis is to uncover voting alignments
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based on shared attitudes and values of
the judges. ^
A judicial

According to Goldman.

voting bloc can be said to exist
when, in

nonunammous cases, two or more judges vote with
each other

more frequently than with all other judges
on their court
in at least a majority of the cases in
which they jointly
^
participate.^
Here bloc analysis was used to determine whether
Nixon appointees
tended to have their highest rates of agreement with
each other or with

other Democrats and Republicans.

It was assumed that if they did form

cohesive blocs with each other and with similar ideological
types, the

disposition of cases on the Courts of Appeals might be radically altered,
whereas if they did not, the influence of the Nixon appointments would
be minimized.

3

There is no evidence of "log rolling" on federal appellate courts
according to Sydney Ulmer. See "Toward a Theory of Sub-Group Formation
in the United States Supreme Court," J ourna l of Politics, XXVII, No. 1

-

(1965), p. 133.
4

Sheldon Goldman, "Conflict on the United States Courts of Appeals
1965-1971," Cincinatti Law Review XXXXII, no. 4 (1973), p. 645. Goldman
describes the McQuitty method of bloc construction as one designed to
identify psychological types.
In this method, "one first examines the
matrix of rates of agreement and underlines the highest percentage
agreement in each column of the matrix. The highest percentage agreement
is selected first, and the individuals with the highest percentage
agreement constitute the core of the first bloc. The next step is to
read across the rows of these individuals and bring in all of the people
whose entries were underlined indicating that they have their highest
agreement with one or more members of the core bloc. Then the rows of
these new members must be examined to determine if they bring in more
members.
When no more members are brought in, one returns to the highest
remaining percentage agreement, which forms the core of the second bloc.
A similar process of reading across the rows is followed until that bloc
The matrix is analyzed until all individuals are classified
is exhausted.
However, this analysis imposed three qualifications upon the
by bloc."
identification of blocs: first, each judge had to serve on a minimum of
four cases with all other judges included in the blocs and, second, a
judge whose highest agreement was less than fifty percent was dropped
from the analysis,
p. 645-6.
,
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Unfortunately, there were sufficient
non-unani.ous cases to include
Nixon appointees in the bloc analysis
of only five of the circuits,
as
can be seen in Figure

.were revealing.

However, the results in these
five circuits

I.

In the third circuit three
of four Nixon appointees,

Rosenn, Adams, and Hunter, joined Democrat
Aldisert and Republican

Van Dusen in

a

in bloc) bloc.

"moderate" (determined by mean of individual
judge scores

Another Nixon appointee. Gibbons, ^ however,
agreed most

readily with Democrat Seitz, and they formed

a

"liberal" bloc.

Moreover,

Gibbons agreed with fellow Nixon appointees Hunter,
Adams, and Rosenn

only forty, fifty-seven and sixty percent of the
time respectively, as

compared to his one hundred percent agreement with Seitz.
tees then, did not constitute

a

Nixon appoin-

monolithic or particularly "conservative"

bloc in the third circuit and no radical swing to the right is
suggested
there.

Moreover, the third circuit did not appear to be seriously

divided.

Individual scores ranged only from Aldisert's .89 to Gibbons'

1.30 and the difference between the mean scores of the blocs was .28.
Bloc analysis of ths fifth circuit revealed

pattern:

one "conservative" and one "moderate."

a

similar two-bloc

As in the third circuit,

three Nixon appointees divided between the two blocs.

Two Nixon appoin-

tees joined two Republicans and five Democrats in the nine-man "conserva-

tive" bloc which had

a

mean score of .59.

joined five Democrats in
1.04.

a

One Nixon appointee, Clark,

six-man "moderate" bloc with

a

mean score of

As in the third circuit, the blocs were remarkably cohesive,

particularly in the "conservative" blocs where all agreements were

^Recall that Gibbons was sponsored by Senator Case, the most "liberal"
(A.D.A. score .88) Republican Senator eligible to veto Nixon appointees.
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FIGURE

I

VOTING BLOCS ON THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS IN
NON-UNANIMOUS CRIMINAL CASES; FISCAL
1970-73

Third Circuit
1.00 (12)+
Seitz (D)*^- Gibbons (N)

Rosenn (N) '
1.00

1.00 (9)
zz^- Adams

(N)

1.00 (5)

(6)

Hunter (N)
l.Ooj

(5)

Van Dusen (R)
.69

(13)

Aldisert

Bloc Type:

"liberal"

mean score:

1

.

(D)

"moderate"

30

1

.02

Fifth Circuit
1.00 (8)

Thornberry (D) ±zz^ Morgan (D)

1.00 (8)
Brown (R)

Bel

(D)

/

i.oo:

\
1.00

Ainsworth (D)

(6)

1.0d\(5)

Ingraham

.90

Roney (N)

,(N)

1.00||(6)

l.Ool
v\

(5)

'

i

Coleman (D)
Bloc Type:

Mean Score:

1

.59

.04

*Indicates judge group

\Dyer'

"conservative'

"Moderate"

(D

stands for Democrat)

+Number of cases on which agreement score computed

Gewin (D)

'(D)

(10)

Wisdom (R)

'
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Ninth Circuit
.90

(10)

Hamley (R)
.80

Browning (D)

(10

.80

Hufstedler
A
.78

(5)

^Wright (N)

(D)

.88 (8)

Merrill
.80

(R)

(5)

_ Duniway

.80

Koelsch (R)

\

(D)

(5)

Wright (N)

(17)

Ely

Bloc Type

"liberal"

:

mean score

"moderate"

1.78 without Wright
1
56 with Wright
1.00
(7)
Kilkenny (N) tiz^Trask (N)
:

.

'

-

1.00

>^

!(4)>^

.83

']

1.00'

Chambers (R)

.33 without Wright
1.18 with Wright
1

(4)

Carter (D)

(6)

Barnes (R)
Bloc Type:
"conservative"
mean score:
.17

District of Columbia Circuit
.91

(22)

.87

Robinson (D) ^.-—^ Wright (D)
.90

!

(10)

i

Fahy (D)

A
.83

(56)

Bazelon (D)
Bloc Type:
mean score:

"liberal"

"moderate"

.80
(13)

.89

1

.92

Tamm (D)riz;Wilkey (N)
.76-1(25)

.78T(9)

MacKinnon (N)

Robb (N)

Bloc Type:
mean score:

.31

"conservative"

(23)

McGowan (D) ^=:r^Leventhal (D)
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one hundred percent with the
exception of the ninety percent
agreement
between Wisdom and Gewin. Agreement
in the "moderate" bloc
ranged from
seventy to one hundred percent.
Although Clark in the "moderate"
bloc
agreed more with the Democrat Morgan,
this should not obscure the fact
that he also agreed eighty percent
of the time with fellow Hixon
appointees, Roney and Ingraham.

Moreover, flixon appointee Clark agreed
with

fellow Nixon appointees Roney and Ingraham
more than with any other

members of the "moderate" bloc where he was
placed by the method for

computing the blocs.

Thus the Nixon appointees do form a fairly
cohesive

"bloc" in the fifth circuit although the formal
analysis does not show it.

Although the seventh circuit did not produce enough
non-unanimous
decisions for bloc analysis, there were sufficient cases
to suggest that
the Nixon appointees Pell and Stevens were not likely to
constitute

a

as they agreed in only one of four cases in which they
participated.

bloc

PelL

on the other hand, agreed one hundred percent of the time with
"conservative" Democrat Cummings in five cases, and Stevens agreed twice in
three

cases with "liberal" Democrat Swygert.

Again, in the ninth circuit, three Nixon appointees who decided
enough cases to be included in the bloc analysis were divided between two
of the three blocs that emerged there.

A "liberal" bloc was composed of

three Democrats, one Republican, and one Nixon appointee, Wright, who
also could be classified with the "moderate" bloc.

The "moderate" group

consisted of one Democrat, two Republicans and, again, Nixon appointee
Wright.

A five-man "conservative" bloc contained the other

appointees along with two Republicans and

a

Democrat.

two Nixon

In contrast to the

third and fifth circuits, the blocs in the ninth circuit were sharply

.
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split ranging from the .17 mean
score of the "conservative" bloc
to the
1.77 mean score of the "liberal" bloc
with Wright excluded.
The mean
score of the "moderate" bloc was
1.33 with Wright excluded.
Although it

appears anomalous to include Nixon
appointee Wright in the "moderate" or
"liberal" blocs when his score for
non-unanimous votes (.73) is considered,
a

closer examination of the matrix reveals
that he agreed with fellow

Nixon appointees Kilkenny and Trask only
three times in eleven decisions
in which they jointly participated.

On the other hand, he agreed with

Merrill and Duniway of the "moderate" bloc
eighty and seventy-eight per-

cent of the time respectively, and he also agreed
with both Hamley and

Browning of the "liberal" bloc eightly percent of the
time.

Thus it

appears that Wright is correctly placed in either of
those blocs and

separated from his fellow Nixon appointees in the "conservative"
bloc.
Only in the District of Columbia Circuit, of the five circuits
so
far analyzed, did the Nixon appointees, as on the Supreme Court,
comprise
a

cohesive and sharply "conservative" monolith.

There, Nixon appointees

Wilkey, MacKinnon and Robb joined Democrat Tamm in

with
a

a

mean score of .31.

a

"conservative" bloc

The "conservative" bloc was arrayed against

"liberal" bloc (mean score of 1.80) consisting of Democrats Robinson,

Wright, Fahy and Bazelon.

A third bloc (mean score .89)

combined

Democrats McGowan and Leventhal
Thus although the results of the bloc analysis are tentative and

await further research, it appears that the Nixon Administration was
able to appoint

a

cohesive and monolithic group of judges to only the

District of Columbia Circuit (and to some degree the fifth circuit) where

appointment conditions similar to those on the Supreme Court prevail.

r
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These findings must be counterpoised
against the aggregate figures
presented
in Table 23 which show a
greater percentage of Nixon
appointees falling
into "conservative" blocs than
either Republicans or Democrats.
TABLE 23

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF EACH JUDGE GROUP
IN "LIBERAL
"MODERATE." AND "CONSERVATIVE" BLOCS

Bloc
Type

"

Nixor1

Demo crat

Repub" ican

Appoi itee

%

#

%

#

%

16

43%

5

29%

2

13%

23

33%

9

24%

3

18%

5

33%

17

25%

Con.

12

33%

9

53%

8

54%

29

M%

Total

37

100%

17

100%

15

100%

69

100%

Lib.

Mod.

#

To tal
#

%

Socio-Political Background Characteristics
and Voting Behavior

The proposition that differences in judicial behavior can be in part
traced to the varying values and attitudes of judges is generally accepted
by scholars who study the courts.

Scholars engaged in quantitative analysis,

however, have achieved only limited success in identifying socio-political

background characteristics associated with voting behavior.

Generally

speaking, prior political party affiliation has been, as with studies of

American legislative bodies, the best single predictor of judicial voting
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behavior, particularly with regard
to economic Issues.^

More germane to

this study, Goldnian's earlier
studies of the courts of appeals
found that
party, age and religion were the
background variables which best corre-

lated with appellate voting behavior
in criminal cases.

7

A„d Nagel, in

another early study of state supreme
court justices, found prior prosecutorial experience to be significantly
correlated with voting behavior in
O

criminal cases.

Most research in this area has assumed
explicitly or implicitly that
"interests," as objectively defined by
socio-economic class, are prime

determinants of political attitudes and values; and
that these attitudes
and values are further refined, modified and
transformed by professional

training and experience.

Thus determinations of social class have been

based on undergraduate and postgraduate education,
religion, father's

occupation, and family political status and influence.^

Studies of

political socialization have focused on regional origin and intensity
of

social, economic and political ties to

a

particular region and party

Walter Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Study of Public Law
Random House, 1972), pp. 105-107.

,

(New York:

^Sheldon Goldman, "Voting Behavior on the United States Courts
of Appeals Revisited," American Political Scie nce Review, LXIX, No. 2
(June 1975), p. 503.
g

Stuart Nagel, "Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases," Journal
of Criminal Law LIII, No. 3 (1962), p. 336.
,

g

See John Schmidhauser, The Supreme Court:
Its Politics ,.
Personalities, and Procedures (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,
Also see Sheldon Goldman, "Johnson and Nixon
1960), Chapter 3.
Appointees to the Lower Federal Courts: Some Socio-Pol i tical Perspectives," Journal of Politics XXXIV, No. 2 (1972).
,
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affiliation and activismJ^

Studies of professional socialization
have

focused on occupation prior to assuming
judicial office, types of legal
experience, years served on a particular
court, and professional and
social

ties among judges serving in the same
circuit or on the same

collegial courtJ^

Age as related to attitudes has also
been studiedj^

Here, judges were first coded on nine
background characteristics:

party, religion, candidacy for or election
to public office, prior

judicial or prosecutorial experience, appointing
President, age, years on
the Courts of Appeals, and A.D.A. score of
Senator or Senators of

President's party from the particular judge's state.

These background

characteristics were treated as independent variables.

The scores of

each judge who decided at least six non-unanimous cases
over the period
fiscal

1970-73 and the scores of those who decided fifteen

case"^

^^^^^

unanimous and non-unanimous during fiscal 1973 were treated as the

dependent variables.

For the dependent variables there were two different

but largely overlapping groups of judges, ninety-seven in the first group

(non-unanimous, fiscal 1970-73) and one hundred and four in the second
(fiscal

1973).

The advantage of the second grouping was that it included

thirty-seven Nixon appointees, whereas the non-unanimous case group

^•^See Kenneth Dolbeare, "The Federal Courts and Urban Public Policy:
1960-57" in Grossman and Tanenhaus, Frontiers of Judi cial Research
(New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 19697!
See also Kenneth Vines, "federal
District Court Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South," Journal of
Politics Vol. 26 (1964), pp. 336-356. Also Goldman, Loc. cit .. "Johnson
and Nixon Appointees," p. 939.
,

^^See Robert Carp, "Scope and Function of Intra-Circui t Judicial
Communication," Law and Society Review VI, No. 1 (Feb. 1972), p. 405.
,

^^Goldman, Op. cit ., "Voting Behavior Revisited,"

p.

31.

3

,
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included only sixteen Nixon
appointees.

These judge scores and the

m ne

background characteristics were
run using the Statistical
Package for the
Social Sciencesl^ and tests were
also run to obtain the medians
for each
of the three judge groups along
with tests of statistical
significance of
the differences in medians
in addition, the stepwise
multiple

regression procedure was used to measure
the total contribution of all
the variables taken together in explaining
the variance in voting

behavior and

a

partial correlation analysis was
undertaken to measure

the unique contribution of each variable
taken alone to the variation in

voting behavior.
Of the nine independent variables tested, only
appointing president
(coded Nixon appointee or non-Nixon appointee)
was related in

a

statisti-

cally significant way to voting on non-unanimous
cases and only religion
(coded Protestant or non-Protestant) was related in

a

significant way to voting on all cases in fiscal 1973.

statistically
Consequently,

religion and appointing President were selected for further
analysis along

with age and prior prosecutorial experience which Goldman and Nagel
respectively, had found in earlier studies to be related to voting behavior
in criminal

cases.

The results of the statistical analysis of just the four

background characteristics are presented in Tables 25-27.
Stepwise multiple regression and partial correlation were two of the
1

Norman Nye, Dale Bent and Hadlai Hull, Statistical Package for
the Social Sciences (New York:
McGraw Hill, 19707^
^^Mann Whitney U Test.
Described in Sidney Siegel, loc. cit .,
116-127.
"When at least ordinal measurement has been achieved, the
Mann-Whitney U Test may be used to test whether two independent groups
have been drawn from the same population." p. 116.
pp.

5
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tests utilized by Bowen and
later by Ulmer^^ and GoldmanJ^
and are
probably the most sophisticated
statistical tests yet employed
in backgrounds analysis of judicial voting
behavior.
These tests make formidable assumptions of interval
measurement and normal distribution
of

dependent and independent variables that
are technically difficult to
justify and must therefore be used with
caution.

However, they do permit

an approximation of the important
research questions these methods
seek
to answer, and taken in conjunction
with tests based on the more

realistic assumptions of ordinal measurement,
without assumptions of
normal distribution, can suggest a more
complete portrait of the pheno-

mena under investigation.

The results of the stepwise multiple regression
were consistent with
the findings of other studies that only

a

small

percentage of the variance

in voting behavior can be explained by reference to
background character-

istics.

The total explained variance attributed to all

the independent

variables taken together was 11.7 percent for all cases in fiscal 1973
and sixteen percent for non-unanimous cases from fiscal 1970-73.

The partial correlation indicated that religion was the most important variable in explaining variations in voting behavior on non-unanimous

cases during fiscal 1970-73, followed by appointing President and age.

Nixon appointees, Protestants and older judges tended to be more

"conser-

vative" than Catholics, Jews, younger judges and those appointed by

1

Sydney Ulmer, "Social Background and Supreme Court Voting,"
American Journal of Political Science XVII, no. 3 (August, 1973),
pp. 622-629.
,

1

/-

Goldman, loc. cit.

"Voting Behavior Revisited."
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TABLE 24

STEPWISE MULTIPLE REGRESSION
ANALYSIS OF
BACKGROUND VARIABLES AND SCORES

Variable in Order
of Entry in
Regression

Issue

Criminal
Procedures
1970-73

Mul tiple

Rel igion

Variance

.284
.335
.339

President
Age
Prosecutor

Criminal
Procedures
Fiscal 1973
All Cases

% of Explained

R

President
Rel igion
Age
Prosecutor

Presidents other than Mixon.

8.0

n.2

.40

15.9
16.0

.243
.325
.340
.342

10.5
11.5
11.7

5.9

v-/\pv;i

ICIIV.C

«yuo

mGT:

rSiutGu

in a statistically significant way to the voting
in non-unanimous cases.

When voting behavior for all cases in fiscal 1973 alone

is considered,

appointing President is the most important variable, followed by
religion, with neither age nor prosecutorial experience being related
to
the voting in a statistically significant way.

However, as with the step-

wise multiple regression, the partial correlation shows the significantly
related background variables accounting for only
the variance in voting behavior,

Goldman and Bowen.
in criminal

a

a

small

proportion of

finding consistent with those of

However, the association between religion and voting

cases demonstrated by Goldman is supported by the findings

here while the relationship between prosecutorial experience and voting

behavior discovered by Nagel
behavior and age

is

is

not.

The association between voting

supported for one group of cases but not for the other,

.
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TABLE 25

CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF BACKGROUND
VARIABLES
AND SCORES ON ISSUES

Background
Issue

Variabl e

Criminal
Procedures
Fiscal
1970-73
non-unan.
cases

Age

Criminal
Procedures
Fiscal '73
All Cases

Age

Pres.
Pros
Rel.

Pres.
Pros.
Rel.

i-tff u uraer
Correlation
With Issue

Partial

(3d ord)

Correlation
With Issue

Reduction
Unexplained
Variance

-.142
-.189 n.s.*
-.035 n.s.
-.284

-.232

-.294

5.4
6.3
0.0
8.7

.002 n.s.
-.243
-.068 n.s.
-.223

-.0939 n.s.
-.256
-.045 n.s.
-.224

0.0
6.7
0.0
5.0

.035 n.s.

Not statistically significant (greater than
could be obtained by chance).

5

in 100 that result

Thus the findings concerning voting and background
characteristics remain

mixed.

The medians tests are largely consistent with these findings.
Nixon appointees have statistically significant lower median scores than

Democrats and Republicans on non-unanimous cases and statistically signi-

ficant lower scores than Democrats on all cases decided during fiscal
1973.

The difference between the medians of Nixon appointees and

Republicans for all cases in fiscal 1973 approaches but does not reach
statistical significance.

Moreover, 57 percent of Democrats are above

The small difference in medians between Nixon appointees and
Republicans on 1973 cases approaches statistical significance at .06.
In one sense, however, statistical significance is meaningless as the
study has included the entire population of eligible judges and blue

.

.
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their own circuit median in
non-unanimous cases and 58 percent
in all
cases decided in fiscal 1973.
In contrast, only 27
percent of Nixon

appointees were above their own
circuit median score in fiscal
1973 cases
.and also in non-unanimously
decided cases.
Forty percent of Republicans
were above their own circuit median
for
all

cases in fiscal

1973, and

52 percent of Republicans were above their
own circuit medians for nonunanimously decided cases, fiscal 1970-73,
as can be seen In Table 27.

TABLE 26

MEDIAN SCORES OF JUDGE GROUPS ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURES ISSUES

Democrats

N-Unan.
Crim.
Cases
1970-73

Med.

#

Republ icans
Med
if

.95

53

.88

% of Judges
Above Own

.

58%

22

Nixon
Appointee

Signif
Nix.

Level
Nix.

Mori

U

.45

22

.01

.01

33

.00

.06 N.!

52%

u eiu

27%

Circ. Med.

Cases
Fiscal
1973

.63

% of Judges
Above Own

48

57%

.48

23

40%

.46

27%

Circ. Med.

N.S.

stands for not significant.

collar criminal cases for the time period studied. Tests of statistical
significance can be treated usefully if the cases are considered to be
only a sample drawn from all the criminal cases that these judges have
decided or will decide during their careers.

,
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TABLE 27

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND MEDIAN
SCORES OF
JUDGES ON CRIMINAL ISSUES

Protestant
Med
#
.

NonProtestant
Med.

Difference

Significance

#

Non-unan.
Crim.
Cases

.67

(63)

1.14

(34)

.47

.01

(70)

.64

(34)

.16

.02

1970-73
All

Cases
1973

.48

Similarly, there are large statistically significant
differences

between the median scores for Protestants and non-Protestants
on both nonunanimous cases and for all cases decided during fiscal 1973.

Finally,

the differences between the median scores of the judges without prior

prosecutorial experience and those with prior prosecutorial experience is

almost non-existent for cases decided in fiscal 1973 and only

.11

on non-

unanimous cases with the non-prosecutors scoring higher, as can be seen in

Table 29.

In neither case,

however, were the differences in median scores

between prosecutors and non-prosecutors statistically significant.

On

the contrary, there was a better than even chance that the difference was

attained by accident.
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TABLE 28

PROSECUTORIAL EXPERIENCE AND MEDIAN
SCORES OF
JUDGES ON CRIMINAL CASES

Non-

Prosecutor

Prosecutor

Med.

Med.

#

Difference

Significance

#

Non-unan.
Crim.

.80

(43)

.91

(54)

.11

.52 N.S.*

.52

(47)

.53

(57)

.01

.67 N.S.

Cases
1970-73
All
Crim.

Cases
1973
*

N.S. stands for not significant

Exclusion of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
When the judges of the fourth and fifth circuits are excluded from
the computation of medians for the judge groups, Nixon appointees outside

the south have higher median scores than non-Nixon Republicans on the
fiscal

1973 cases which included unanimous decisions, and markedly higher

scores than the Republicans on the non-unanimous cases, as can be seen in

Table 30.

The median scores for Democrats remained about the same (63.5)

for the 1973 cases but rose to 1.23 on the non-unanimous cases, as can be

seen from Table 30.

These findings, like those in the aggregate analysis,

support the view that it was primarily in the southern and District of
Columbia circuits, where the Nixon Administration had

a

relatively free

hand in the selection process, that the Nixon Administration best fulfilled
its campaign promises.

It is possible that the greater "conservatism" of
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non-Nixon Republicans outside
the South as compared to
Nixon appointees
outside the South, can be
explained by the greater age of
the former
group, all of whom were
appointed before 1960.

TABLE 29

MEDIAN SCORES OF JUDGE GROUPS:
FOURTH AND
FIFTH CIRCUITS EXCLUDED

Democrats

Republ leans

Nixon
Appointees

Diff. Between
Nix. & Rep.

All

Cases
1973

63.5

NonUnan.
Cases

1.23

.43

.46

.03

.46

.63

.17

Median Scores of Protestants and non-Protestants:
Controlling for Party
When Protestants and non-Protestants of the same political
party
are compared, differences still emerge between the different
religious
groups, as can be seen from Table 31.

Democratic non-Protestants had

higher median scores than Democratic Protestants and Republican non-

Protestants, and Republican non-Protestants had higher median scores than

Republican Protestants on the non-unanimous cases, although their scores

were identical on the 1973 cases.

Religion then was an important factor

in explaining differences in voting behavior within as well

judge groups,

a

as between

finding consistant with the partial correlation analysis.
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TABLE 30

MEDIAN SCORES OF PROTESTANTS AND
NON-PROTESTANTS ^^^^^^^^^
COMPAREDPOLITICAL PARTY HELD CONSTANT

Prot

1973
Cases

.56

1970-73
Cases

.88

Democrats
Non-Prot.

In conclusion,

.72

1.31

Diff.

Republ icans
Prot.
Non-Prot.

Diff.

.16

.45

.46

.00

.43

.57

1.11

.54

the medians tests as well as the composite
scores of

the judge groups, suggest that attitudinal cleavages
underlie at least

some of the observed differences in judicial voting
behavior on the
Courts of Appeals.

However, the bloc analysis as well as the correlation

analysis suggest that the Nixon Administration failed to appoint

a

mono-

lithic and cohesive group of "law and order" judges to the Courts of

Appeals.

In

on doctrinal

order to explore this issue further, the next chapter focuses
positions taken by the judges in cases involving the law of

confessions and admissions.

CHAPTER

V

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE OPINIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS JUDGES IN CRIMINAL
CASES
INVOLVING COERCED CONFESSIONS

A substantial segment of the federal
judiciary may justifiably
believe that the Supreme Court went too far
in (the Miranda)
decision and that the specificity of the procedural
safeguards
prescribed by it has had the effect of creating
an unnecessary
straitjacket that should be loosened to permit use
of custodial
statements voluntarily given, even though the
interrogations
have failed to touch all the bases prescribed by
Miranda.
But
any modification of Midanda must come from the
Supreme Court or
by constitutional amendment.
Until then we are bound by that
decision.

--Nixon second circuit court appointee Mansfield dissenting
in United States v. Collins
562 F. 2d. 792 (1972), p. 801.
,

What makes this case exceptional is that the nation's highest
ranking law enforcement officer, the then Attorney General, saw
fit to lash out publicly at the panel decision while the
Government's petition for rehearing en banc was pending before
the court.
In a speech delivered to the National District
Attorney's Association, the Attorney General singled it out as
"case number one" in his explanation of what he unfortunately
sees as the public's loss of confidence in the ability of the
courts to dispense justice.
I
had understood that the Department of Justice's professed policy was, wisely, to refrain from
comment on pending cases and to make its argument in court. The
Attorney General's deviation from that sensible rule clearly
endangers the integrity of the judicial process.

--Truman appointee David Bazelon of the District of Columbia
circuit dissenting in United States v. Frazier 476 F. 2d.
(1973), pp. 901-2.
It has been shown in the preceding chapters that the Nixon

Administration possessed both the desire and the opportunity
judicial policy on criminal issues.

to change

Moreover, it has also been shown

that Nixon appointees to the United States Courts of Appeals cast

a

greater proportion of their aggregate votes in criminal cases against
the accused than did appointees of previous administrations, and it has
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been suggested that differences
in the voting behavior of
the three groups
may be accounted for, in part, by
possible attitudinal cleaveages among
them.

However, bloc analysis of individual
circuits reveals that the

Nixon appointees to the Courts of
Appeals apparently lack the attitudinal

cohesiveness of Nixon appointees to the
Supreme Court and appear to be

attitudinally

a

more diverse group than his
appointeesto that high Court.

The analysis to follow will explore this
issue further by comparing the
doctrinal responses of Nixon appointees to each
other and to non-Nixon

Democrats and Republicans.

The issue to be examined, allegations of

coerced confession or statement, was the most politically
charged of the
criminal

issues in the vociferous debate of the 1960si and, as
the quotes

that precede the text of this chapter indicate, the judges
of the Courts

of Appeals were not oblivious to the political pressures surrounding

confession issues in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

However, exclusion

of confessions from criminal trials in the United States is not of
recent

origin nor is the controversy over It, which dates back to the Supreme
Court's 1943 decision in McNabb

mittently since then.

v.

United States^ and has recurred Inter-

Prior to Moore

v.

Dempsey^ (1923), exclusion of

coerced confessions was based on the long established common law rule
that coerced confessions were untrustworthy evidence.

case the Supreme Court fashioned

a

However, in that

"fair trial" rule based on "the

totality of the circumstances" to govern court review of state cases under

^

McNabb

^Moore
3

v.
v.

United States 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
Dempsey 261 U.S. 86 (1923).

Otis Stephens, The Supreme Court and Confessions of Guilt
University of Tennessee Press, 1973), p. 17.
(Knoxville:
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the fourteenth amendment.

Then in 1936 in the case
of Brown v.

MLssissi££i,^ the court specifically
included coerced confessions as
violating the fundamental fairness
doctrine.

It was

not until

the mid

nineteen-sixties that the court was to
tie the exclusion of confessions
rationale for both state and federal
cases to, first, the sixth amend-

ment's right to counsel, and second,
5
to the fifth amendment's
prohibition against compelled self-incrimination.^
The essence of the Court's early attempts
to operate under the

trusthworthiness and fairness doctrines was the
effort to decide whether
the confession was truly voluntary (apparently,
no one at that time was

suggesting that all use of confessions should be
prohibited).
early cases, including the aforementioned Moore

v.

In the

Dempsey and Brown

v.

Mississippi, this effort was not particularly difficult
as the cases
often involved obvious physical coercion.'^

Later when the Court was to

confront more subtle techniques of extraction short of physical
torture
that pervaded the law enforcement techniques of much of the
nation, the

decisions were to be legally and politically more difficult.
in these cases would be more elusive and the social

"Justice"

consequence of

judicial action potentially greater.

The problem with the voluntariness standard as

a

guide to court

action was, according to some critics, its subjectivity and therefore

unpredictability as

^ Brown V.
^

^

Escobedo

Miranda

guide to law enforcement officers and lower courts.

Mississippi

,

296 U.S.

Illinois

,

378 U.S. 478 (1964).

v.
v.

''Stephens,

a

Arizona
1oc.

384 U.S. 444 (1966).

,

cit.

278 (1936).

.

Chapter

3.
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Generally

a

determination of voluntariness
or coercion involved

balanc-

a

ing of police conduct against
the individual's capacity
to resist.

One
solution, it seemed, to avoiding
the voluntariness test was
prompt
arraignment so .hat a neutral magistrate
might inform a suspect of his
rights, including silence and
counsel,

and the Federal Rules of
Criminal

Procedure provided for arraignment
"without unnecessary delay."
the Supreme Court seized on that
provision to throw out

without questioning its voluntariness. ^

a

In 1943

confession

Thus it embarked on

a

quest to

avoid the more discretionary case-by-case
approach to confessions that
was to lead eventually, at the high tide
of its effort, to Miranda

Arizona.

v.

Some Congressmen reacted immediately and
with hostility to the

McNabb decision, thus initiating the long political
struggle with members
of Congress over the law of confessions which
was to reach an intense peak
in 1957 and 1958,

continue through the nineteen-sixties, pouring over
into

the arena of presidential

politics in 1954 and 1968, until it finally

began to subside with the election of President Nixon, the
exit of Justices
Fortas and Warren, the first Nixon appointments to the Court, and
the
gradual retreat of the court itself on certain aspects of criminal

procedure.

The McNabb decision was followed in 1957 by the closely akin Mai lory
v. ilDited

States

,^

which affirmed it.

But these were federal, not state,

cases and the federalism issue so volatile in other issue areas handled by
the Court during the nineteen-fifties had not yet been broached with

regard to criminal procedures.

^McNabb

^Mallory

v.
v.

The first stroke of the court in regard to

United States, loc. cit.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).

3

2
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confession cases was the Escobedo decision
of 1954 which extended the
right to assistance of counsel back to
the time when

interrogated.

Once again the Court threw out

questioning its voluntariness.

Escobedo

,

a

a

suspect was being

confession without

however, did not lay down

a

detailed procedure that police must follow before
and during interrogation.

Thus it was left to Miranda v. United States

,

which followed two

years later, to bureaucratize the law of confession and
admissions by

outlining

a

detailed procedure for police to follow prior to and during

the questioning of

a

suspect.

The Miranda decision provided the following general guidelines:
First, the suspect was to be warned that he had

a

right to remain silent

and that anything he said could be used against him.^^
to bo told that he had

a

Second, he was

right to consult an attorney before and during

questioning and that if he could not afford it, an attorney would be
appointed for himJ^

Third, the suspect could waive his right to

silence and an attorney (in practice over ninety percent did) but the

waiver must be "knowing," "intelligent," and there was to be
burden" on the prosecutor to prove such.
a

a

"heavy

1

Finally, even after effecting

waiver, the suspect was to reserve the option of reasserting his right

to silence and counsel

at any point in the subsequent questioning, and

the police were to respect it.

1

Ostensibly, if these procedures were

followed by the policy both in spirit and letter, courts could assume

^ '^

Miranda

v.

Arizona

^hbid.,

p.

470-472.

^^ibid.,

p.

475.

l^Ibid,

,

op.

cit.

,

pp. 468-9,
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that confessions and admissions
obtained thereafter were voluntary,
and
could avoid the older and supposedly
more subjective balancing of
police

methods against individual capacity to
resist.
,its

ambitious attempt to create

a

Miranda, however, despite

more uniform objective and settled
law

of confessions and admissions, contained
many seeds of continuing controversy.

When was

a

suspect to be considered "in custody"?

were the police to say to

a

written warnings sufficient?

Exactly what

suspect to implement the decision?

Were

What did the prosecution have to prove to

demonstrate "knowing and intelligent" waiver of rights?

What standard

of proof was to prevail in lower court hearings on motions
to suppress

confessions, beyond

a

reasonable doubt or preponderance of the evidence?

Did an assertion of right to counsel or silence or

a

refusal

rights preclude further police attempts to interrogate?

to waive

Once

a

waiver

had been obtained did subsequent interrogation sessions require new

warnings?

Could

a

tainted confession inadmissible in the state's direct

case be used for secondary purposes such as impeachment of

a

defendant's

in-court testimony, or as an aid in gathering evidence which would be

admissible?
Complicating further the political and legal picture that Miranda
had attempted to simplify was the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets

Act of 1968,

14

which purportedly reversed both the Mai lory and Miranda

decisions and reestablished the voluntariness test as the prevailing

standard in the law of confessions and admissions.

On firm ground with

Mai lory , which had been based on the Court's construction of a

^^Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, (1968), 18 U.S.C.,
Sections 921-928.
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Congressional statute, the act

v;as

of doubtful constitutionality in

attempting to reverse .Miranda, which was based
on the constitutional
strictures of the sixth and particularly the
fifth amendment to the
^

federal constitution.

Ramsey Clark, then Attorney General under

President Johnson, ordered his staff to ignore

it.

However, when

John Mitchell became Attorney General under the Nixon
Administration,
he advised Justice Department attorneys to adhere to Miranda
procedures

but to introduce even tainted confessions if agents had
inadvertently

fallen short of those standards
^^ii^anda thus

.""^

raised new questions, many of which remained

unanswered by the Supreme Court.

Numerous studies have been conducted

concerning the impact of the Miranda decision on the police.

Few

studies, however, have focused on the responses of lower court judges
to the issues raised by Miranda and its progeny.

purposes of this chapter

is

Thus one of the

to identify some of the doctrinal

responses

of the Judges of the United States Courts of Appeals to confession
issues posed during the 1972 term and before.

Second, an attempt will be

made to ascertain whether there are significant doctrinal differences
between the Nixon appointments and previously appointed Democrats and
Republicans on confession issues.

'^Stephens, op. cit.

^^Ibid., Chapter

7.

,

p.

164.
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Statements Taken from Suspects
After Assertion of Rights
to Silence or Attorney
The central issue posed in most
Miranda confession cases during
the
years fiscal 1970 through 1973 concerned
the voluntariness of a waiver
Of rights and what police conduct
was permitted in securing
such a waiver.
Fred Graham in his analysis of the
Miranda case and its impact was
undoubtedly correct in observing that Miranda
had only pushed the voluntariness

question back- from the confession itself
to the waiver of rights.

""^

Several cases presented these waiver issues
to the appeals judges during
the 1972 term and earlier:

involved

a

A second circuit case, United
States v. Collins^ ^

nineteen-year-old heroin addict who three times
declined to

answer questions before finally signing
robbery.

waiver and confessing, to bank

a

Judge LumbardJ^ joined by Hayes, with Mansfield
dissenting, held

that Collins' decision to waive his rights "was not
made involuntarily."

We do not believe that anything decided in Miranda was
meant
to prohibit police officers from ever asking a defendant
to
reconsider his refusal to answer questions. .Such a rule finds
no support in the fifth amendment, nor, fairly read,
in Miranda
itself, nor in common sense.
Here Collins was not subjected to any immediate reinterrogration but only asked to reconsider his refusal to
answer.
So long as such reconsideration is urged in a careful,
non-coercive manner at not too great length and in a context
that a defendant's assertion of his rights not to speak will be
honored, it does not violate the Miranda mandate. ^0
.

"Fred Graham, The Self Inflicted Wound
p.

(New York:

MacMillan, 1970),

182.
1'

R

"United States

v.

Collins

,

462

F.

2d.

792 (1972).

^^Lumbard (R, .47), Hayes (D, .82), Mansfield (N, 1.33).
"R" refers
to non-Nixon Republicans, "D" to non-Nixon Democrats and "N" to Nixon
appointees.
The number represents the score on at least six non-unanimous
cases.
^^

United States

v.

Col

1

ins

,

op.

cit.

,

p.

797.

"
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According to Judge Lumbard, "Collins
had been told and could
see
that if he [Collinsl told them [the
agents|
"21
to stop they would.

Mansfield, however, in dissent, called
for reversal of Collins'

conviction because he found it "difficult
to conceive of

a

clearer

violation of the plain and unequivocal
prescription laid down by Miranda
than that revealed here. "22

Strict and literal interpretation of the Supreme
Court's
directions in Miranda would have required the
government
thereafter to cease efforts to interrogate Collins,
at least
until he was represented by counsel. 23
Pointing to the fact that on the morning of the
confession Collins
had refused to answer questions at ten and ten-thirty
before agreeing at

eleven, Mansfield found it "not surprising that

a

nineteen-year-old

addict broke down.
Another second circuit case. United States
simiiar issue.

Massimo , 24 involved

defendant to reconsider his

a

refusal to answer questions," and that such

a

practice did not amount to

coerced waiver.
In Hendricks v.

2

hbid

^^
2^

^^

a

Judge Hayes, 2^ writing also for Moore and Smith, held that

the police have the privilege of "asking

a

v.

Swenson,

an eighth circuit case, Judge Heaney,27

.

Ibid

.

,

p.

800.

Ibid

.

,

p.

799.

United States

v.

Massimo

25MoGre (R,

.05), Smith

^^Mendricks

v.

Swenson

27Heaney (D, 2.00).

,

,

(D,

463

F.

2d.

1171

(1972)

1.83).

455 F., 2d.

503 (1972).
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in a dissenting opinion,
adhered to the view that
fliranda required that

the suspect not be questioned
further after declining to
make a statement.
Judge Van Pelt, with whom Judge
Gibson agreed.^S however, held
the

waiver voluntary under the circumstances.

Thus in these three cases
the

majority employed the old voluntariness
test based on the totality of
the
circumstances, whereas the dissenters
attempted to avoid that test through
their reading of the Miranda decision.

Police questioning after an as.pr tion of
the sixth circuit case of Combs

v.

ri ghts

Win^o,^^ however,

by the acr.i.pd

in

unanimous panel

a

consisting of Judges McCree, Weick and Peck,30
reversed the conviction of
the defendant who had requested but was denied,
aid of counsel before

making

a

statement.

Interrogating officers had agreed to stop
question-

ing but then showed the accused an incriminating
ballistics report.

seeing the report, Combs "broke down and confessed."

The appellate panel

held that the showing of the ballistics report was really

question without

a

On

"a/nothef/

question mark..."

...according to Miranda interrogation must cease when a
defendant requests an attorney .. .once defendant has asserted
that he wants to exercise his rights, a statement taken
after that cannot be other than the product of compulsion. .31
.

Similarly in the seventh circuit case of United States
28
29

Gibson (D, .18), Van Pelt (District Judge).
Combs V. Wingo

455

,

2d.

F.

""""McCree

(D,

1.80), Weick (R,

3^

op.

cit.

^^

Combs

,

United States

,

v.

p.

97 (1972).

.00), Peck (D,

.38)

99.

Crisp

,

435

F.

2d.

354 (1970).

v.

Crisp ,

102

Judges Curings, Hastings and
Fairchild,^^ condemned

confession taken

a

after the suspect had asserted
his right to silence.

Crisp signed

a

waiver but then said he did not
want to talk about the bank
robbery.
The
agent then questioned him about his
actions just before and after
the
robbery.

Writing for the panel, Cummings
held that

Both the letter and the spirit of.
..Miranda call for condemnation of this. ..police conduct...
NoFlT-eTTthe slightest
circumvention or avoidance may be tolerated.
The rule that
interrogation must cease, in whole or in
part, in accordance
with the expressed wishes of the suspect
mean just that and
nothing less. Once the privilege has been
asserted,
an
interrogator must not be permitted to seek
its retraction
total or otherwise.
Nor may he effectively disregard the'
privilege by unreasonably narrowing its intended
scope. 34

The fifth circuit took an intermediate
position with regard to the

issue of the taking of

United States

arguing that

statement after an assertion of rights.

Anthony,

v.
a

a

In

appellant contested his theft conviction,

statement taken from him in the absence of counsel
after he

had requested counsel had to be suppressed independently
of the issue of

voluntariness.
Morgan,

36

A unanimous panel consisting of Judges Brown, Goldberg
and

held in

a

per curiam decision that the continued conversation

with the arresting officer had been initiated by the appellant and thus
was admissible as evidence.
In Hopkins wc held that if an accused person initiates the
conversation his statements do not result from interrogation
and are therefore admissible. ^7

^^Cummings (D,
34

^^

Hastings (R,

Cris£, op. cit .,

p.

United States

Anthony, 474

Brown (D,
^^

.57),

Anthony

,

v.

.40), Fairchild (D,

357.
F.

2d 770 (1970).

.92), Goldberg (D, 1.78), Morgan (D,
op.

cit.

,

p.

773.

.67).

1.23)
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In the Hoakins^S ^^^^ ^^^^^^^

^^^^.^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^

had been joined by Tuttle and
Wisdom^^ in rejecting the contention
that
no statement could be taken after

another case, United State^
and

a

v.

a

refusal

to sign a waiver.

In still

Phe]^,^^ Goldberg was joined by Dyer^l

district judge in reiterating the Hopkins
position that voluntary

statements were admissible evidence even after
refusals to sign waivers.

Consistent with the Hopkins doctrine,

Judge Thornberry,

42

a

unanimous panel of

Brown, and Morgan in United States

v.

Priest^ ^ held

that police questioning of Priest in his hospital
room after his refusal
to sign a waiver "until

after seeing an attorney" was forbidden by

^ii^anda even though Priest had talked freely and
voluntarily.

If such a request is disregarded and the questioning
proceeds,
any statement taken thereafter, must be presumed a
product
of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
In contrast to the fifth circuit,

circuit upheld
refused to sign

(

a

unanimous panel in the fourth

per curiam ) appellant's conviction even though he had
a

waiver and had not initiated the ensuing statement.

Judges Boreman, Craven and Butzner,^^ held that Thompson had admitted
^

^Hopkins

v.

United Stat es, 433

"^^Tuttle (R, 1.80), Wisdom (R,

^^

United States

v.

Phelps

F.

2d.

1041

(1970).

1.30).

,

433

F.

2d.

245 (1970).

,

409 F.

2d,

491

^'oyer (D, .40).

^^Thornberry (D,
^^
^^

United States
Ibid

.

,

p.

1

v.

.20).

Priest

(1969).

792.

^^Boreman (R, .80), Craven (D, .88), Butzner (D, 1.56).
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that he understood his rights
and "thereafter freely and
voluntarily
answered questions "'^^
.

Three positions, then, are discernible
in the preceding cases:
(1)

No statement can be taken from

waiver of rights.

suspect after refusal to sign

a

a

This position, adhered to in the
sixth and seventh

circuits, was espoused by eight judges;
five Democrats, two Republicans
and one Nixon appointee.

This position is most closely
associated with

the Miranda precedent's attempt to
supersede the old voluntariness test

with an objective,

rule.

(2) A

second position taken by the fifth

circuit would allow the taking of statements from
suspects who had
refused to waive their rights as long as the suspect
had initiated the

further conversation, but it would condemn statements
taken as
of further police questioning after
rights.

(3)

a

a

result

suspect's refusal to waive his

The third position, most closely associated with the second

and fourth circuits, would allow continued police attempts to
interrogate
a

suspect even after he had refused to waive his rights, as long as such

further police efforts were non-coercive as determined by the circumstances.

Six Democrats and three Republicans took this position.

Although there were three alternative interpretations of Miranda
in the eight cases just discussed, dissent occurred in only two cases

(in the second and eighth circuits).

In other circuits such disparate

types as Judges McCree (score 1.80), Peck (score .38), and Weick (.00) of
the sixth circuit, Fairchild (1.23) and Hastings (.40) in the seventh

circuit, and Goldberg (1.78), Morgan (.67) and Dyer (.40) in the fifth
^^

United States

v.

Thompson 417

F.

2d.

196 (1970)
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circuit, were able to agree on

a

particular doctrinal position, despite

the fact that some unanimously decided
cases presented opportunities for

judicial disagreement.

Moreover, there was no evidence that
judges were

concerned about settling acknowledged inter-circuit
conflict.
Interrogation Without the Knowledge of

a

Retained Attorney

A similar and troublesome issue for the
judges in fiscal 1973 and

earlier concerned the questioning of accused persons
without the knowledge of their retained attorneys.

dealt with this issue, which

is

Four cases involving three circuits

another form of the first question (which

involved continued attempts to interrogate after an assertion of rights).
The third circuit faced this issue in United States v. Cobbs

.^"^

Cobbs was visited in jail by police officers who did not inform his

attorney.

He agreed to waive his rights and confess.

The court of

appeals, in an opinion for the court written by visiting district judge

Bechtle joined by appeals judges Rosenn and Hunter,

condemned the ethics

of the police action but upheld its constitutionality citing the seventh

circuit

s

In a

decision in United States

v.

Springer

49
.

dictum Bechtle admitted that constitutional rights are

endangered, because
The relationship between lawyer and client risks significant
erosion and the ability of counsel to effectively represent
his client is seriously jeopardized when this kind of interrogation ensues.

^^ United States v. Cobbs

,

481

F.

2d.

^^Bechtle (District Judge), Rosenn
^^

United States

^Qlbid.,

p.

200.

v.

Springer 460

F.

197 (1973).

(N,

1.17), Hunter (N, 1.00)

2d.

1344 (1972).
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However, he refused to reverse
the conviction, and
suggested safeguards:
These risks would be... reduced
if... the district court
would expect... the prosecution
to
inclu
de c'ihat
the accused prior to making a
statement, specif^cali/
acknowledged that he was aware that
he was represented bv
an attorney... however we do
^
not require such ev?dence^^

Although the third circuit refused
to impose this higher standard
of proof of waiver under these
circumstances, it acknowledged the
seventh

circuit's ruling that "...there is

a

higher standard imposed to show

waiver of the presence of counsel once
counsel has been appointed. "^^
This position of the seventh circuit,
taken in United States

was by

a

Stevens

53

v.

Springer

,

divided panel with judges Pell and Cummings
for the majority and
dissenting, upholding Springer's bank robbery
conviction.

Police officers had visited Springer in jail for
the purpose of having
him correct and sign

a

typed version of an earlier oral confession.

There

were no verbal warnings at the time and no further police
questioning.
Springer was given
signed.

a

warning card containing

He then signed the confession.

a

waiver which he read and

His attorney had not been

informed of the visit.
Pell, writing for himself and Cummings, held that there was "no per

se rule that talking to

a

man without his attorney would vitiate

sion or that the mere reading of

warning."

54

a

Since there was no per se rule. Pell deferred to the district

^Ibid ., p. 199.

^^Pell
54

confes-

waiver form was an inadequate Miranda

S^ibid.
^

a

(N,

.53), Stevens

Spri nger , p.

1352.

(N,

.91)
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court's finding that Springer's
waiver was voluntary because
there was
substantial evidence to support that
conclusion.
v,

We are not prepared to say that
the evidence was not enough
to give substantial support to
the decision.
We do this
recognize that there is a higher
standard
imposed to show waiver of the presence
of counsel once
counsel has been appointed than before...

f

ZIL

Stevens, however, held that the visit (by
agents) to Springer's
cell without informing his attorney was
"such a departure from procedural

'regularity' as to violate the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. "^6
A later case^^ involving this issue in the
seventh circuit resulted
in three more judicial

responses to the problem.

Police had questioned

appellant Durham four timas after his arrest and
preliminary hearing without telling his retained counsel.
as forbidden by Messiah v.

actively by Mcleod

v.

Judge Swygert^^ condemned this practice

United States

,

which had been applied retro-

Oh^lo.^*^

I read Massiah to bar the admissibility of
the statements
obtained here since the government had initiated adversary
judicial proceedings against Durham prior to the time the
statements were obtained. .it (the government) could not,
in my opinion, permissibly interview the defendant without
advising his counsel. °'
.

Massiah, however, had involved

^

^Ibid

^^

^^

Ibid

post-indictment confession.

a

.

.,

p.

1355.

United States

v.

Durham

475 F. 2d. 208 (1973).

,

Swygert (D, 1.44).
^^

Massiah

Mcleod
^^Durham,

v.
V.

p.

United States
Ohio

,

211.

,

377 U.S. 201

(1964).

85 S. Ct. 1556, 378 U.S. 582.

(1965).

Swygert
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applied it to any situation where adversary
judicial proceedings had been
initiated.

Swygert's reading of Massiah would have
avoided the waiver

issue by ruling that agents can never question
an accused person without

informing retained counsel.

He would have awarded a new trial

in this

case and forbidden the use of the confession in
the new proceedings.

Judge Pell was equally troubled by the ethical issues
involved, but
refused to jettison the voluntariness test.
To the extent that the opinion of Chief Judge Swygert
rests
upon a per se rule that would exclude confessions when counsel
is not notified of or present at the interrogation,
I
dissent
from the opi nion. .Not withstanding the existence of counsel...
a defendant may waive the presence and assistance of
that
counsel, provided it very clearly appears that the accused
deliberately and understandi ngly chose to forego that assis.

tance.^^
Pell's position had changed, however, from his opinion in the earlier
Spri nger case.

...when the interrogation takes place after knowledge of the
existence of counsel the situation calls for a ventilated
determination that there was a deliberate and knowing
waiver. The burden in this factual situation on the prosecution is a heavy one, but I do not agree with the implicit
premise of Swygert's opinion that it is an impossible
accomplishment. .1 would remand for a hearing on the matter
of voluntariness."^
.

Judge Castle^^ disagreed with both Pell and Swygem, and was the
only one of the three who would have affirmed the conviction.
he argued that since this was

to Pell

a

1961

In

response

conviction, Miranda did not

apply and therefore the pre- Mi randa rule of voluntariness of the confession
62

Ibid

.

,

p.

212,

63i

4bid.

^^Castle (R, insufficient

voters

upon which to compute score).
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under "a totality of circumstances"
rather than the

post-Mi^

"volun-

tariness of waiver" doctrine, was
controlling.
...even if Durham could prove his
waiver was not knowina
and voluntary his failure to
point to any other proof of
^^^^
confession admissible under p;e
ei

Ei'Xy^

Thus Castle adhered to the older
test of admissibility of confessions.
Pell was operating under his
interpretation of the more stringent
Miranda

rules and Swygert under even stricter
rules which he claimed were

imposed by Massjah and McLeod.

Pell

and Swygert formed the majority
since

they were able to agree to remand the case
for

a

lower court determination

of the factual questions concerning the circumstances
under which the

confession was signed.
Finally, in the 1970 term case of United States

v.

Crisp

,

Judges

Cummings, Hastings and Fairchild^^ "declined to read into
McLeod any holding that after indictment a defendant may never effectively
waive his

right to counsel

.
.

"^^

.

Although agents could have informed Crisp's attorney...
failurg to do so does not require a reversal in this
case."^
As with the earlier issues concerning continued questioning after

refusal of accused persons to waive their rights, both inter- and intra-

circuit conflict were evident in cases concerning police questioning without

^^Durham,

p.

215.

United States

v.

Crisp

^'^Fairchild (D, 1.23).
^

^Crisp

^^

,

p.

358.

Ibid ., p. 358-9.

,

loc.

cit.

no
informing the retained attorney
of the accused.

Yet in two of the four

cases there was no dissent, despite
the fact that the cases
turned

exclusively on differing possible
interpretations of the law.
More importantly for this study, four
Nixon appointees, Rosenn and
Hunter in the third circuit, and Pell
and Stevens in the seventh,
split
three different ways on the issues
just discussed.
This finding further
reinforces the revelations of the bloc
analysis that the Nixon appointees varied in their attitudes toward
criminal

issues from circuit to

circuit and within individual circuits.

Failure of Police to Honor Requests for Counsel
A number of similar cases dealt with confessions
obtained after

assertions of right to counsel had not been honored by
the police, the
issue addressed in the landmark Escobedo
V.

v.

Illinois

.'^"

In United States

Howards^^ in the District of Columbia circuit, appellant Howards
had

been arrested in North Carolina for robbery and felony murder.

After

being read his rights he said he "didn't know whether he should get an

attorney in Raleigh or wait until he got back to Washington, D.C."''^
The arresting officer said that he couldn't advise Howards and then
showed him

a

confession signed by three accomplices,

interrogation tactic used in the Escobedo case.

waive his rights and confess.

a

familiar police

Howards then agreed to

On appeal from his conviction he argued

that Miranda required all questioning to cease after an assertion of

^^Escobedo
^^

v.

Illinois, loc. cit.

United States

^^Ibid.

,

p.

408.

v.

Howards

,

470

F.

2d.

406 (1973).

Ill

rights.

A unanimous panel

consisting of Nixon appointee Judge
MacKinnon

and Democrat McGowan, with Denocrat Leventhal^S
concurring, held that

Howards had not expressed an unequivocal desire
for an attorney.

"'Being

undecided about an attorney," they wrote, "is
substantially different from

making

a

request for an attorney. "^4

j^e court also noted that informing

Howards of the confessions of his fellow suspects was
not coercive in this
case because the information was true.

Leventhal in his concurrence,

however, had "some difficulty with pursuing

a

man who says he wants an

attorney through the means of advising him of the confessions of the
others in the hope that he might be led, as he was in this case, to say
he wanted to tell what he knew and respond to the question.

he quoted Miranda

"'^^

In this respect

:

If he (the suspectl indicates in any manner and at any stage
of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking there can be no questioning. 76

Leventhal, however, voted to affirm the conviction because Howard's

former trial experience and

a

second waiver of rights to

him "no doubt" that the confession was voluntary.

gave lip service to Miranda and to

a

a

magistrate gave

Thus, although Leventhal

per se rule of exclusion of confes-

sions, he ultimately, like the others on the panel, employed

a

voluntari-

ness test based on an examination of the relevant circumstances.

^^MacKinnon (N, .20), McGowan (D, .71), Leventhal
^^Howards,
^^

Ibid .,

^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.

p.

p.

407.

410,

(D,

77

1.06)
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In the fifth circuit an
unanimous panel with Judge Gewin^^
writing

for Goldberg and Dyer upheld the
conviction of

a

Colombian citizen

arrested in Florida who had requested
to see the Colombian Consul
but
who had waived his rights and confessed
after that request was denied by

arresting officers.

Gewin wrote that

The assertion of a desire to see the Colombian
Consul was at
most an ambiguous request the motivation for
which was unknown
It does not show the specific connotation
necessarily involved
the request for counsel.
To conclude that such requests
would invoke Miranda protection would unnecessarily
and
universally broaden the purpose of the Miranda
decision. 79

m

In the eighth circuit case of lijilt£d_S±ateL
v.

Young, 80

unanimous

panel of Judges Duffy, Cummings and Sprecher^^ held
that police failure to

honor Young's request for counsel did not vitiate his subsequent
spontaneous confession to

a

postal

inspector, because the police themselves

had not interrogated Young and the postal inspector was part of

tinct investigative body.
rights did not invalidate

a

dis-

Therefore, Young's early assertion of his
a

later waiver.

In the ninth circuit case of United States v.

La Monica

,

Judges

oo

Goodwin and Merriir^ and District Judge Skopil upheld appellant's con-

viction even though
of rights.

a

statement had been taken and used after an assertion

Police had not questioned LaMonica further after he had

^^Gewin (D, .86).
^^
^'^

United States

v.

Arroyave

United States

v.

Young

^^Duffy
^^

(D,

,

477

,

471

F.

.80), Sprecher (N,

United States

v.

LaMonica 472

^^Goodwin (N, .00), Merrill

(R,

2d.

F.

2d.

154 (1973), p.

162.

109 (1972).

.33).
F.

2d.

580 (1973)..

1.36), Skopil

(District Judge).
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expressed the desire to retain counsel and
remain silent.

Instead they

had taken him to an office for inventory of
his personal possessions.
In the course of this routine "booking"
procedure, a police officer find-

ing

receipt in La Monica's pocket asked, "What does
this mean?"^^

a

La Monica replied that he had retained an attorney
before his trip "just
85
in case something went wrong."
The admission was used at La Monica's

The appellate panel held the statement admissible because
the

trial.

policeman's question had not been intended for the purpose of obtaining
an incriminating statement from the suspect.

The judges pointed out

that La Monica had not been subjected to persistent and coercive inter-

rogation and that there had been no resort to guile or trickery.

Thus

the judges in this case clearly leaned toward the voluntariness test in

their justification of their decision.
In a similar fifth circuit case,

Dempsey

v.

Wainwright

,

Dempsey

had requested an attorney after his arrest and two hours later refused
to sign a waiver.

later said to

a

He was not supplied an attorney at that time, and

police officer,

"I

did it but you will never prove it."

This statement was used in his trial and he challenged its admission on

Judges Wisdom and Roney

appeal.

procedural grounds, but Rives
hold

a

88

87

voted to affirm the conviction on

dissented, asking the district court to

hearing to determine whether Dempsey 's statement was

^^ La Monica

,

p.

581

^^Ibid.
85

Dempsey

v.

Wainwright 471

^^Roney (N, .36).
^^Rives (D, 1.69).

F.

2d.

604 (1972)

a

result of
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the failure to provide counsel
within

a

reasonable time after his reqest.

Appellant's request for counsel
should have been honored
n

t

e

subTecred

appenan^luld
^^^^--^

^r-'-'r?'

0

^Uhout'thf ad\1se°orcounsel!8r'"^

'

''"^'''^^

Ambiguous or Contradictory Statements
of Defendant Rights

Another issue that split the judges during
fiscal 1973 concerned
the use of ambiguous or contradictory
statements of defendant rights by

arresting officers.

Umteiitatei

In

v.

Massimo^Q second circuit judges

Hayes, Moore, and Smith upheld the validity
of

a

police warning which

included the statement, "We have no way of
furnishing you with

a

lawyer

but one will be appointed for you if you wish, if
a^d when you go to
court. "^^ This statement followed immediately the
traditional warning of

right to counsel before and during questioning.^^

Hayes reasoned:

Massimo w.^s clearly warned that he could have a lawyer present
during the questioning. The only conclusion that Massino
would have been justified in reaching on the basis of the
warning was that since he was clearly entitled to have a lawyer
present during questioning and since no lawyer could now be
provided, he could not now be questioned. ^3
This opinion relies directly on the identical holding of the fifth
89

90
91

Mainwriqht

,

United States
Ibid

.

,

p.

607.

p.

v.

Massimo, loc. cit.

1173.

92

The full warning is as follows:
"You have the right both to a
lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have him with
You have the same right to the advice and
you during questioning.
presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have
no way of furnishing you a lawyer but one will be appointed for you,
if you wish, if and when you go to court." p. 1173.
^^Ibid.

,

p.

1174.
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circuit in United States

Lacx,94

v.

,

,,3^ ^^^.^^^

^.^^^^

^^^^^

There, Judges Wisdom, Coleman, and
Simpson found that the above warning administered by federal

agents comported with Miranda
requirements

because the fact
that the attorney was not to be appointed
until later seems
immaterial since Lacy was informed that he
had the right
to put off answering any questions
until the time when he
did have an appointed attorney. 95

The seventh circuit case of United States ex^re}.

Wijm^

^'

Twomey 96 involved the use of an identical warning
by Indiana and
•

Illinois police.

However,

divided panel. District Judge Dillin, writ-

a

ing with the agreement of Judge Swygert, with Pell

in dissent, condemned

the warnings because:

requires a clear and unequivocal warning to an accused...
We hold that the warning given here was not an effective and
express explanation. .. In one breath appellant was informed that
he had the right to appointed counsel during questioning.
In
the next breath he was told that counsel could not be provided
until later... The entire warning is..., at best, misleading
and confusing and, at worst, constitutes a subtle temptation
to the unsophisticated, indigent accused to forego the right
to counsel at this critical moment... The practice of police
interrogation of an accused, after informing him that counsel
cannot be provided at the present time, is a practice anticipated
and expressly prohibited by the Miranda decision.

'''i'^^nda

Pell, in dissent, lamented that although "there was little doubt that

the defendant committed the homicide.

..

(he) may be freed because of non-

compliance with an overly technical application of the Miranda rule.'

^

^United States

^^
^^

Ibid

.,

p.

ex. rel

.,

p.

1250-51

58lbid.,

p.

1253.

Ibid

Lacy 446

F.

2d.

511

(1971).

513.

United States

97.

v.

98

.

Williams

v.

Twomey 467

F.

2d., 1248 (1972).
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I

cannot agree... that the Miranda
warnings must

unse^'fre'
^f.f^nl

Z

nd

now"

^

convev tn

govLn.en^furn?sh^d'°

^^^^

means the police

^^^^^^^tic statement beca
po
ponce
e statlonJ'dr'.T
stations do not furnish
.

government counsel

e

Tf

ni-

contended that the accused. 'did.
^or
answer questions on a voluntary
basis/there would be
indeed a heavy burden upon the
state to demonstrate
ls

TOe"t'

^^^^^-^-^

i^n^bu^de^

-

Pell would have remanded the case
for a hearing on the voluntari-

ness Issue and again placed himself
in the "voluntariness plus" camp

wtih regard to waiver of rights.

Finally, he admonished the police

to eliminate this source of constitutional

challenge by revising their

warnings.
To summarize, this type of warning, clearly
designed to nullify
the impact of Miranda and,

it seems,

in fairly widespread use at both

federal and state levels, was upheld by eight judges and
condemned by
two, with one. Pell, in the intermediate position of not
condemning the

warning but not affirming the conviction either.

Thus over two thirds of

the circuit judges were found to have narrowly interpreted Miranda

standards, about the same proportion as with the other issues.

Here

again, moreover, although the cases turned on different interpretations
of the law, two of three decisions were unanimous.

Another issue, involving warnings that seemed

to

suggest leniency

in return for a waiver of rights, was faced by panels on the fifth and

seventh circuits.

In Frazier v.

United States

,

a

fifth circuit case

decided in fiscal 1971, Judges Rives, Wisdom and Rodbold, in

99 Ibid.

100 Frazier

v.

United States

.

434

F.

2d.

934 (1971)

a

per curiam
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decision, held that Frazier's confession
was not made involuntary by
reason of the single fact that the
F.B.I, agents told him that
if he

cooperated with them his cooperation
would be made known to the U.S.
Attorney, and that there might be some
consideration given by the U.S.

Attorney but that the agent could make
no promises.

Standing alone,

wrote the court, this was not sufficient
to establish that Frazier's
in-custody confession was involuntary.^*^^
The seventh circuit case United States
the identical

v.

Springer^ O^ presented

issue to Judges Pell, Cummings and Stevens.

of encouraging Springer,

a

In the

course

bank robbery suspect, to confess, agents

(apparently as part of routine procedure) told Springer
that the judge,

prosecutor and

U.

S.

Commissioner would know of his willingness to

cooperate, "although they could make no promises."
his rights and confessed.

Springer then waived

Pell, writing for Cummings with apparently no

objection from Stevens (who dissented on other grounds) held that:
no public policy should castigate a confession of crime merely
because it may have been prompted by the hope that cooperation
might achieve or increase chances of a lenient sentence. '^^

All

six judges then held that this particular statement was not

enough, taken alone, to vitiate

a

waiver.

In the second circuit a confession obtained through the promise of

reduced bail was upheld by Judges Lumbard, Kaufman and Hays, who relied
on the "voluntariness" of the waiver under the "totality of the circumstances."

^Q ^bid

.,

pp.

995-5.

^Q^ United States
^°^Ibid.

,

p.

v.

1347.

Springer

,

loc.

cit.
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They held that Bram

v.

UnitelStatei"' ^4 which had held confessions

involuntary if "obtained by any direct or
implied promises, however
slight," had not been applied by the Supreme
Court in subsequent cases
-,with

"wooden literalness" and that the Supreme Court
had "made it clear

that the test of voluntariness was based on all the
circumstances "^^^
.

Adequacy of Written Warnings

Three cases dealt with the adequacy of written explanations of
Miranda warnings without oral additions.
United States

v.

Bailey ,^^^

In the fifth circuit case of

Judges Goldberg, Brown and Morgan approved

the use of warnings presented in writing only.

case of United States

v.

Springer^

In the seventh circuit

(already discussed with regard to

other issues), Judges Pell, Cummings and Stevens similarly held that
"certainly the fact that the warnings given were only by

cannot be dispositive."
1

States

V.

Johnson

a

written form

In an earlier seventh circuit case. United

no

,

Judges Kiley, Castle and Kerner upheld

a

confession

involving the questionable verbal warning that the suspect "could have
lawyer if and when he went to court" because appellant had signed

correct written statement of his right.

a

a

"Having signed the written

waiver form, without evidence to the contrary, he cannot now contend that
^Q^ Bram v. United States

,

18 Supreme Court 183 (1897)

^^^Case cite misplaced.
^^^

United States

v.

Bailey

United States

v.

Springer

^^^United States

v.

Johnson, 426

^^^

,

468
,

F.

loc.
F.

2d.

652 (1972).

cit.
2d.

1172 (1972).
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he did not understand his rights.

"""^^

Other cases involved the absence of any warnings
whatsoever in
police interrogations of American citizens in
foreign countries.

In

two cases decided in the fifth and ninth circuits
judges agreed that

Miranda warnings were not required in foreign countries
because the
policy purposes of Miranda to prevent third degree tactics
could not be

affected in
trials.

a

foreign country by excluding the confessions from American

The only question in these cases, said the judges, was whether

or not the confession was voluntary.
In the fifth circuit's

Kilday v. U.S.^ ^^ a unanimous panel of

Judges Wisdom, Ainsworth, and Clark upheld the conviction of an appellant
who had been arrested and questioned in Argentina without Miranda^ warnings.

In the more controversial

citizen was questioned

in

United States

v.

Trenary ^^^ an American

Mexico with the aid of an American customs

official acting as an interpreter.

Trenary, who was not aware that the

interpreter was an American official, was given no warnings and confessed.
Judges Chambers, Carter and Wright,

in an unanimous per curiam opinion,

upheld the conviction pointing out that the American Customs agent had

only asked questions posed by the Mexican police and had asked no questions of his own.

"^Q^

^^^
^^^

Ibid .,

p.

For precedent the court relied on

United States v.

1115.

Kilday v. United States

United States

v.

481

.

Trenary

,

F.

2d.

655 (1973).

433 F. 2d. 680 (1971).

^^^Chambers (R, .11), Carter (D, .06), Wright (N, .73).
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Chavarna 113 and United State^

Naaelberr^l

v.

1

*

decided in the ninth and

second circuits respectively.
In f^agel berry

,

decided in fiscal 1971, Judge Smith,
who was joined

by Friendly and Hays, held that

The Miranda rule has no application in a
case., where the
arrest and interrogation were by Canadian
officers
Th-~
presence of an American officer should not destroy
the
usefulness of evidence legally obtained on the
ground that
methods of interrogation of another country, at
least
equally civilized, may vary from ours.
In Chavarria,

another fiscal 1971 case, Duniway, Carter and

Hufstedler were unwilling to apply Miranda to foreign interrogations
because of the "ineffectiveness" of the exclusionary rule as

a

deterrent

to foreign police methods.
In other cases

involving

lack of Miranda warnings. Judges Hastie,

a

Van Dusen and McLaughlin of the third circuit upheld the confession and

conviction of

a

sixteen-year-old who had been questioned for two and

a

half hours at midday without being informed of his rights to silence or

counsel, because the judges found that "under the circumstances" the

confession had not been coerced.
pre- Miranda conviction.^

States V. Gaynor ,^

^

^

However, this case stemmed from

Judges Kaufman, Anderson and Cakes overruled

United States

v.

Chavarria

^United States

v.

Nagelberry

^^^ ibid
^^^
^

.,

Loray

p.
v.

443

,

,

F.

2d.

904 (1971).

434 F. 2d. 585 (1970).

587.

Yeager , 446

United States

v.

1961

And in the second circuit case of United

court's decision that a postal inspector was required to interrupt

^^^

a

2d.

F.

Gaynor

,

472

1360 (1971).
F.

2d.

899 (1973).

a

lower

a
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Gaynor's spontaneous admissions with

a

warning "that he doesn't have to

make the statement and that if he does make
it, it will be used against
him."
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In an earlier interrogation
session Gaynor, who was being

^•nvestigated for mail theft, had waived his
rights.

Only in the eleva-

tor, after the interrogation session, had he made
his unsolicited

admissions.

Another second circuit case. United States
dealt with the issue of adequacy of warnings.
the theft of
counsel

v.

Carnegl ia ,^^^ also

Carneglia, arrested for

tractor, claimed that he was not warned of his right to

a

prior to his on-the-street interrogation.

The arresting officer

claimed that "he had probably warned him," because he "usually did."

In

an unanimous opinion. Judges Feinberg, Lumbard and Friendly affirmed the

conviction, reasoning that

"

Miranda was not

a

ritualistic formula."

Clearly the judges were relying on the older voluntariness test in

considering personal characteristics of the suspect and deciding that he
knew of his right to counsel even if not told of it by the police officer,

Feinberg acknowledged that Miranda had admonished that courts should not
"enquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his
rights without the warnings being given."

However, he

holds,

"(W)e do not think that evidence of subsequent conduct here
irrelevant to show what Carnegl i
understood from warnings
which concededly were administered. '20
is

By focusing on what appellant understood rather than on what was said,

the panel, in this case, concededly engages in the kind of "speculation"

^^^Ibid.

,

900.

^^^ United States v. Carneglia

^^Ojbid.,

p.

122.

,

468

F.

2d.

1084 (1972).
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about "the knowledge defendant
possessed" that Miranda forbids.
Proof of Waiver
Four cases during fiscal

proof that

a

1973 involved the issue of
government

waiver was "knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary," as

required by Miranda.

In

Unitedjtates

v.

banc District of Columbia Court, Frazier,
a

waiver and then began to confess to

a

Fra_zier,121
a

decided by an en

robbery suspect, first signed

series of robberies and shootings.

When, however, the interrogating officers
began to take notes on his

confession the defendant objected, and he also
objected to the officer's
offer to write up the confession and have him (Frazier)
sign

it.

When

the officer put the pad away Frazier again began
to talk freely and

confessed to the robbery, for which he was subsequently
convicted.

Democratic Judges McGowan, Tamm and Leventhal joined Nixon
appointees
MacKinnon, Robb and Wilkey in upholding the waiver, confession, and
conviction.

McGowan, writing for the majority, relied on

a

psychologist's

testimony in the trial court that Frazier was capable of understanding,
and listed other factors such as the fact that Frazier had not been under
the influence, had been warned repeatedly and could hear adequately.

Thus

his opinion reads very much like the rationales offered by previous judges

under the older voluntariness "under the totality of circumstances" test.
Judges Bazelon, joined by fellow Democrats Robinson and Wright,

dissented:

The record makes it crystal clear that the officers failed
to correct appellant's apparent misunderstanding by
explaining to him that an oral confession was as damaging

^^^United States

v.

Frazier, loc. cit.
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because they were afraid he would
stop

talking^'"f
Bazelon continued:

The plain rule of Miranda requires us to
reverse this conviction.
The Supreme Court has stated that a waiver
of the riqht
against self incrimination is ineffective if
there is any
doubt that it was made with full understanding
of the consequences.
Since there is ample reason to doubt
appellant's
understanding here, it was improper for police officers
to
secure his statement, and error for the trial court
to admit
In the eighth circuit case of Hendricks v.

Swenson J^^ Judge

Heaney, in dissent, held that Swenson could not knowingly and
intelli-

gently waive his rights and confess on videotape because, due
to the
novelty of the medium, he could have no real understanding of the

implications of

a

waiver.

blander medium familiar to

Written confessions, argued Heaney, were
a

suspect.

a

The court majority, however, held

that the videotape was not so novel or inherently incriminating as to

require special warnings.

They compared videotape to the already

judicially sanctioned use of photographs

in court.

In the ninth circuit case of United States v.

Hufstedler

Moreno J

Judges

and Wright, and District Judge Lucas, held unanimously that

an express waiver of rights was not necessary where the suspect had

"indicated" that she understood her rights.

122ibid^.

,

p.

The judges held per curiam

122.

^23ibid_.
^^'^

Hendricks

v.

^^^ United States

Swenson
v.

,

loc.

cit.

Moreno, 466

^^^Hufstedler (D, 1.80).

F.

2d.

1205 (1972)
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that courts could look at the particular
case and imply

circumstances warranted.

Here

a

a

waiver where

nineteen-year-old English-speaking,

Mexican-American woman,who had attended high
school in the United States,
had been detained at the border, had been
given proper warnings, had

signed

a

waiver, and had confessed to

a

narcotics charge.

Rights of Juveniles

Three cases dealt with the rights of juveniles in confession
cases
and divided panels in the seventh and eighth circuits.

In United Stat es v

Fowler ,'^^ Judge Kiley, joined by Nixon appointee Stevens, with visiting
appeals judge and Nixon appointee Kilkenny dissenting, held that full

Miranda warnings must be given to juveniles and that
of the right to silence was

a

a

failure to warn

defective warning under the Miranda rules.

Further, Kiley strongly suggested that the presence of an attorney might
be an essential requisite to a voluntary waiver in juvenile confession
cases.

Kilkenny, however, "doubted that full Miranda warnings were

required in juvenile proceedings," but assuming that they were, he

thought that the oral and written warnings given in this case were sufficient, because Mi randa did not require "...a ritual of words to be

recited by rote according to didactic niceties.

"''^^

Both eighth circuit cases, Loray v. Yeager

1

?Q

and Fugate v. Gaffney,

dealt with pre-Mi randa confession cases, decided against the defendant on

^^ ^nited States v.

^^^Ibid.,
^

p.

^^ Loray v.

Fowler

,

476

F.

2d.

1091

1094.

Yeager

,

loc.

cit.

^^Q Fugate v. Gaffney , 453 F.

2d.

362 (1971).

(1973)
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the basis of the voluntariness
of the confession under
the totality of
the circumstances rule.
The
case is notable because of
Judge
Heaney's dissent, in which he, like
Kiley and Stevens in the Fowler

Fu^

case, abandons the voluntariness
test and seems to opt for
something like
a per se rule in juvenile
confession cases:

Two recent Supreme Court cases
have construed Gal legos
as holding,
essence, that a confession secureTTFHF^
fifteen-year-old child in the absence of
counsel or a
parent capable of protecting the child's
rights, violates
the due process clause of the Constitution. '31

m

Retreating slightly from this position, he argues
for at least

a

higher

standard for judging juvenile confessions:
The Supreme Court has always paid special heed
to the age of
the offender in determining whether or not a
child's confession is voluntary and even though the same test was
aoplied.
I.e., the totality of the circumstances test, it
has always'
been applied more strictly in cases involving defendants
of
Caril Fugate's approximate age.'-^<^

Although these cases are not strictly comparable, the liberal
judges want to apply constitutional standards equal to or higher than

adult standards in juvenile cases.

Moreover, their emphasis on the

presence of counsel in judging the voluntariness of
sion comes close to applying

a

a

waiver or confes-

per se rule in the Escob edo-Miranda

tradition where one factor such as age or one defect in the warning,
or failure to provide counsel are determinative of the issue.

Thus

one sees the continual emphasis of the more "liberal" judges on what
critics term as "technicalities" rather than an attempt to fathom the
actual

voluntariness or

^^

hbid .,

p.

368.

^^^Ibid.,

p.

385.

i

nvol untariness of the confession.
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Harris

v.

Newjrorkl^S

m^peaehment Issue

One of the first fruits
of the "Nixon Court" was
the controversial
Harris

v.

Newjork, which so.e critics
clai. partially reversed the

Miranda decision by allowing
the prosecution to introduce
tainted
confessions, not as direct evidence,
but in order to i.peach the
testimony of defendants who took the
stand in their own defense.

Four cases

involving Harris and related issues
of impeachment were heard by
the
Courts of Appeals in fiscal 1973.
In

the second circuit case of United
States v. I<ahan,''34 ^ahan had

lied in claiming that he lacked funds
for a lawyer and wanted one

appointed for him.

This lie was used to impeach his
credibility when

he took the stand to defend himself against
charges of perjury and illegal
aid to aliens.

He claimed that this use of his lie
violated his rights

under both Escobedo and Miranda

constitutional rights.

overturn his conviction.

,

as

it penalized the exercise of

Judges Smith and Feinberg agreed and voted to
Smith wrote:

The government's claim that the privilege [fifth and
sixth
amendment rights alluded to above) does not extend to false
statements is not well taken. The ultimate truth of the
matter asserted in the pre-trial request for appointed counsel
is of no moment.
A defendant should not be forced to gamble
his right to remain silent against his need for counsel or
his understanding of the requirements for the appointment of
counsel .. .Defendant was required to speak in order to obtain
appointed counsel .135

Judge Mansfield, however, dissented.

He argued that, although it

was "settled that self-incriminatory statements given at
^^^
^

Harris v. New York

United

^^^Ibid.

,

,

401

U.S.

States v. Kahan, 479
p.

292.

222 (1971).
F.

2d.

291

(1973).

a

pre-trial
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hearing in support of application for
enforcement of fourth and sixth
amendment rights may not be later
admitted at trial as part of the

government's case.. .this (exclusion) does
not extend to perjury or
false statements. "136
^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^

incriminating statements given at pre-trial
hearing in support of

applications for enforcement of constitutional
rights was not, according to Mansfield, to preclude the accused
from telling the truth at

the pre-trial hearing.

No legitimate interest, he argued,
is served by

extending the rule to outright perjury or
falsification.
It is unnecessary to grant him a license
to falsify in
order to protect his exercise of pre-trial
constitutional
rights.

Moreover, Mansfield continued, the other evidence of
guilt was over-

whelming.
In his dissent Mansfield demonstrated the emphasis on
getting at

the truth as

a

value to be counterpoised against the value of preclud-

ing self-incrimination.

This argument for protecting the truth-seeking

function of trial courts was at the heart of the Supreme Court's

decision in Harris

v.

New York to permit the use of tainted statements

to refute in-court testimony when a defendant chose to take the stand.

""^^

A second aspect of the Mansfield dissent emphasized his faithfulness to
precedent.

In the cases seen so far he went strongly on record in

136 ibid

.,

137 ibid .,

pp.
p.

295-6.
296.

138iponical ly, allowing coerced statements to be used for impeachment purposes abandons also the old common law rule that coerced statements are themselves untrustworthy evidence.
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support Of both riiranda.
Harris

v.

logical

Nev^.

v.

UnUel^tates

and its seeding contradiction,

Glendon Schubert would equate
such seeming ideo-

inconsistency with "dogmatism" as

a

characteristic of the

"judicial mind."^^^

MieA.States ex,_X^

New Jerseyl^O in the third
circuit

involved another impeachment issue.
left the scene and was arrested

a

Burt, after shooting a "friend,"

few hours later on

breaking and

a

entering charge after being discovered
asleep in an abandoned store.
On his arrest for the breaking and entering
charge, he did not mention
to the police that he had earlier shot his
"friend."

Later, on trial

for murder, the prosecution attempted to use
Burt's silence on this

point to impeach his testimony that the shooting was
accidental.

If

the shooting had been accidental, contended the state,
Burt would not

have remained silent, but would have sought aid or enquired
as to the

condition of the friend.

On appeal, Burt contended that the use of his

post-arrest silence violated fifth amendment rights guaranteed in
Miranda

.

In a per curiam opinion,

Rosenn writing

a

Judges Van Dusen and McLaughlin, with

concurring opinion, sustained the use cf silence for

the purposes of impeachment on two grounds:

one, that "the jury had

adequate basis (for its verdict) without the aid or influence cf the
contested evidence," and, two, that since Burt had not been accused of
murder at the time, he was not in the kind of accusatorial situation

1

1

(1973).

Glendon Schubert, loc. cit., chapter one.
AO

United States ex. rel

.

Burt

v.

New Jersey , 475

F.

2d.

235
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to which Miranda rules

applyj^^

Rosenn, however, chose to base his
concurrence on Harris

New York

v.

.

parceiye no difference between
impeachment by prior
inconsistentstatements made in the absence of
a Miranda
warningand impeachment by prior silence
inconsistiHt
withtrial testimony which justifies not
applying the
Harris rationale in the present case.
In weighing the
value to society of ascertaining the truth
in the judicial
process against the value to the individual
of protection
against self incrimination, the court determined
in
^^^'"'"is that the former value must
under some circumstances be given priority when the two values
conflict
directly. '^'^
I

To Rosenn, the coercive effect here was minimal and
not substantial

enough to "raise the defendant's right... over society's interest
pn

discovering the truth]. "^^^

Thus Rosenn, like his fellow Nixon appoin-

tee Mansfield, strongly defended the controversial Harris

v.

New York

decision and stressed the truth seeking functions of the trial courts.
In a similar case in the fifth circuit,

Judge Morgan, supported

by Clark and District Judge Skelton, also held that Harris v. New York

allowed the use of

a

defendant's silence to impeach his testimony once

he had taken the stand.

Appellant Ramirez had claimed under oath that

he had been coerced into selling marijuana and heroin by

Mexico and had been glad to be caught.

a

stranger from

On cross examination and in his

summation, the prosecutor pointed out that Ramirez had never told that

^^

hbid .,

^^^

p.

236.

Ibid ., p. 233.

^^^Ibid.

,

p.

239.

l^^United States

v.

Ramirez, 441 F 2d. 950 (1971)
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Story before, particularly not when
he was arrested.

Morgan explained.

Once Ramirez elected to testify.
..he became subject to the
traditiona truth testing devices of
the adversary proces
including the right of the prosecution
to show his prior
°^ remaining silent at the time of his

arresTl45

The identical issue faced

however,

a

a

panel

divided court reaffirmed

in the tenth circuit.

""^^

There,

district court's dismissal of

a

Johnson's in-court testimony with his prior silence.

Johnson had taken

the stand to claim that the woman he was accused
of raping had consented

after he caught her stealing his car.

The prosecutor on cross examina-

tion rejoined that Johnson, when arrested, hadn't told
the police that.

The prosecutor also alluded to Johnson's silence in his summary
state-

ment to the jury.
^^^^

Yoi^k

Judges Lewis and Murrah reasoned that Harris

v.

allowed the introduction only of inconsistent or contradictory

statements, and that silence was not such
You would have to start warning
could be used against him.''^^

a

statement.

suspect that his silence

a

Judge Brei tenstein, in dissent, contended that
The majority throws up yet another road block to impede the
search for truth in the administration of criminal justice. ..
Harris, he argued, "destroyed Miranda

.

"

Pointing to the conflict

between the fifth amendment's right against self-incrimination and the
duty to testify truthfully, he held that
the majority loses sight of the balance which must be

^^

^Ibid

.,

^^^Jo hnson

^^^Ibid.,
l^Sibid.

p.

v.

p.

954.

Patterson
1068.

,

475

F.

2d.

1066 (1973).
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converts a criminal trial from
a search
fn!"Jr'J!'^;"'"'^
for
truth to a game to be won by
the cleverest players 1^9

According to Brei tenstein,

a

defendant who takes the stand waives
his

right to silence, and there can
be no partial waiver of

a

constitutional

right.
In another impeachment

caseJ^O

^^^^^^

appointees Mansfield. Oakes,

and Timbers applied the Harris precedent
to Escobedo type cases as well
as to Miranda

.

LaVallee, convicted of two murders, had
been denied his

request to see counsel before giving

a

statement which was used to

impeach his in-court testimony that he had shot
in self defense.
To summarize, Nixon appointees Rosenn, Mansfield,
Oakes, Timbers,
and Clark all supported the extension of the
Harris principle, and they

were joined by Republican Breitenstein and Democrat Morgan.

The exten-

sion of the Harris_ principle was opposed by Democrats Smith
and Feinberg

of the second circuit, Republican Lewis of the tenth circuit,
and Democrat Hurrah of the tenth circuit.

In particular,

those who see the

Harris case as controlling stress the truth-seeking functions of the

court and employ a "balancing" test to resolve the issue.

Other Cases

The final major issue facing the courts of appeals during fiscal
1973 was that of delayed arraignment and the Crime Control Act's attempt
to reverse Mai lory v. United States in its holding that unnecessary

delay in arraignment constitutes per se ground for exclusion of

^^^Ibid.,

p.

a

1069.

^^"^United States ex.
(1972).

rel

.

Wright

v.

LaVallee 471

F.

2d.

123

132

confession.

In six casGs decided in four circuits
no judge defied

Congress on this issue, although the ninth
circuit overturned one

conviction in which delayed arraignment was

a

minor factor J

Circuit by Circuit Analysis*

The second circuit was one of the most conservative
in terms of
its stances on doctrinal

issues during fiscal 1973.

Only Nixon appoin-

tee Mansfield endorsed the Miranda precedent in the eight
cases previously

discussed and only Democrats Smith and Feinberg opposed the extension
of
the Harris v. New York precedent.

Ironically, Mansfield supported the

application of the Harris precedent with the same ardor that he supported
Mj^anda.

In spite of the two cases just mentioned there appeared to be

little conflict on the second circuit in confession cases.

Similarly the third circuit emerged as

a

conservative circuit

although this conclusion is based on only two important cases.

The third

circuit endorsed the police practice of questioning without informing
a

retained attorney and the use of

of impeaching his testimony.

a

suspect's silence for the purpose

There were no divisions among the judges

on this latter issue, but Nixon appointee Rosenn was most eager to apply

the Harris principle to the impeachment of

a

defendant's in-court

testimony by use of his prior silence, whereas Van Dusen and McLaughlin

merely avoided the Miranda rule by saying the suspect was not in an
accusatorial situation and therefore Miranda did not apply.

The fourth circuit decided one important and controversial case in
a

conservative fashion by sanctioning continued police questioning of
^^^

United States

v.

Stage

,

464

F.

2d.

1057 (1972).

*The first circuit decided no cases involving alleged coerced
confessions or admissions in fiscal 1973.

a
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suspect after his refusal to sign

a

waiver of rights.

There was no

evidence of conflict on the fourth circuit on
confession issues.

There was almost no evidence of intra-circuit
conflict on the
fifth circuit, which occupied

eleven confession cases.

a

moderate to conservative position in

The circuit refused to allow police to

initiate further conversation if

a

suspect refused to waive his rights,

but they allowed police to pursue the matter if the suspect
initiated

conversation after refusing to waive his rights.

Panels of the circuit

also sanctioned police disregard of "ambiguous requests for counsel"
and police failure to honor request for counsel quickly.
tant,

More impor-

panels of the fifth circuit upheld the ambiguous and contra-

dictory police warning which included the statement that counsel could
not be provided here and now, as well as police offers of leniency in

order to obtain waivers, police use of written warnings, the absence of

warnings in out-of-country interrogations and use of
to impeach his in-court testimony.

a

suspect's silence

There was only one dissent in the

eleven cases decided by the fifth circuit.
The sixth circuit heard only one important confession case and

forbade further police questioning after an assertion of rights.
Unlike the other circuits discussed so far, the seventh was more
liberal

and more divided.

On the two major waiver issues, panels of

the circuit forbade further police questioning after

rights and required

a

a

refusal to waive

"higher standard of proof" of waiver in cases

involving questioning without

a

retained attorney.

split, with liberal Democrat Swygert arguing for

a

Here the judges
per se condemnation

of such practices and Republican Castle opposing the "higher standard
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of proof" rule proposed by Nixon appointee
Pell.

Similarly, the seventh

circuit was alone in condemning police use of
the ambiguous and contra-

dictory Miranda warning that counsel "cannot be
provided here and now
^

but later, in court."

However, Pell opposed

a

blanket condemnation of

such warnings (advocated by Swygert) and called for
remanding such cases
to the lower court for a determination for the
voluntariness of the

waiver on

a

case by case basis.

in requiring full

Finally, the seventh circuit was alone

Miranda warnings for juveniles.

Only in the approval

of police use of written warnings does the seventh circuit conform to
the "conservative" trends of the other circuits.

During fiscal

1973 panels in the eighth circuit decided four cases

against the accused or prisoners.
Heaney dissented.
a refusal

In three of these liberal

Democrat

The circuit allowed further police questioning after

to waive rights, sanctioned the use of videotapes to record

confessions, and allowed the taking of
was unaided by counsel.

a

confession from

a

juvenile who

Heaney's dissents were based on his attempt to

substitute per se rules for the voluntariness test of waiver of rights.
The ninth circuit is more difficult to classify according to the

major issues discussed earlier because most of the cases were only

marginally related to those issues.

Panels of the ninth circuit sanc-

tioned the lack of Miranda warnings in foreign countries even when an

American official was present, did not require express waivers as proof
of voluntariness, and approved inadvertent questioning by

officer after
case of
a

a

a

suspect had refused to waive his rights.

a

police

Only in the

suspect deemed too emotionally upset to waive his rights, did

panel of the ninth circuit overturn

a

conviction, and this case divided
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liberal

Democrat Ely and conservative
Republican Jertberg, the latter

wanting to affirm the confession as
spontaneous and voluntary.
The tenth circuit decided in
use of

a

a

split decision, to disallow the

defendant's prior silence for
purposes of impeaching his in-

court testimony.

Republican Breitenstein dissented,
arguing for the

application of the Harris doctrine.
Finally, the District of Columbia circuit
decided two confession
cases against the accused, one because defendant's
request for counsel

was too ambiguous and the second, because the
court decided that

suspect had intelligently waived his rights.
en banc decision,

a

In the latter case,

an

three liberal Democrats on the circuit opposed three

conservative Nixon appointees, one conservative Democrat and two
moderate
Democrats.

Concl usions

The qualitative analysis of confession cases, like the bloc analysis,

included too few of the Nixon appointees to draw any but tentative conclusions.
than

a

However, Nixon appointees behaved like

narrowly conservative monolith.

a

diverse group rather

Stevens of the seventh circuit

twice disagreed with Visiting Judge Kilkenny of the ninth circuit.

Pell

disagreed with both Rosenn and hunter of the third circuit, as did
Stevens and Mansfield of the second circuit.
"liberal" on confession issues.

vatives," Pell
issue and

a

a

Stevens emerges as

a

Kilkenny, Rosenn and Hunter are "conser-

"moderate," and Mansfield was

a

"conservative" on impeachment issues.

"liberal" on the waiver

Only on the latter

impeachment issue were five Nixon appointees unanimous in support of the
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"conservative" doctrine.

These five were Oakes, Timbers,
and Mansfield

of the second circuit, Rosenn of
the third, and Clark of the
fifth.

CHAPTER

VI

CONCLUSIONS

The major findings of this
study include the following:
(1)

When appeals judges were
aggregated in terms of their

scores on criminal procedures
cases, differences were
observed in
the voting behavior of Nixon
appointees as compared to non-Nixon
Demo-

crats and non-Nixon Republicans
during fiscal 1970 to 1973.
(2)

Nixon appointees voted as if they
were more "conservative"

than these other two judge groups on
both unanimously and non-unanimously

decided cases when voting behavior was
examined in the aggregate, when
median scores of the three judge groups
were compared, or when percentage of judge groups falling into the
"conservative" category or bloc
was computed.

Democrats were the most "liberal" group on
the basis of

these measures, and Republicans fell somewhere
between Nixon appointees
and Democrats.
(3)

However, when the circuit was introduced as

a

control, it

was found that (a) the relationship between the three
judge groups

varied from circuit to circuit with only six circuits conforming
to the

hypothesis;

(b)

the composite and median scores of Nixon appointees and

non-Nixon Republicans outside the South were virtually identical when
only the cases of fiscal 1973 were considered;

(c)

bloc analysis of

individual circuits revealed that Nixon appointees do not constitute

monolithic and sharply "conservative" blocs in any but the District of
Columbia circuit, where voting patterns of Nixon appointees were similar
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to voting patterns of Nixon appointees to the Supreme Court.
(4)

Moreover, when other background characteristics were entered

as controls on the appointing administration variable, the latter was

found to account for only

a small

proportion of the observed variances

in voting behavior among the judges of the Courts of Appeals.
(5)

There also appeared to be

a

relationship between the scores

one
of Nixon appointees and their sponsoring Republican Senator, where

existed.

The most "conservative" Nixon appointees were recommended, for

Senator, or were the
the most part, by the most conservative Republican

Republican
choices of the Administration in the absence of eligible

sponsors.

to
This suggests that Senatorial courtesy was an obstacle

nominees.
the attainment of preferred administration
(6)

also indicated
Finally, doctrinal analysis of confession cases

on confession issues, varying
that Nixon appointees did not always agree
in their legal

but within
positions not only from circuit to circuit,

some circuits.
(7)

this study is that, although
The tentative conclusion, then, of

"conservative" when their voting
Nixon appointees did appear more
constituted, with the exception of the
behavior was aggregated, they
like the cohesive "conservativeDistrict of Columbia circuit, nothing
on the
dominated criminal justice issues
bloc of Nixon appointees which

same period.
Supreme Court over roughly the

The next section of this

this was the case.
chapter will try to suggest why

Explanation of Findings
that the
tend to confirm the view
The findings of this study
from the opposition
faces almost no obstacle
appointing administration
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party in its judicial appointments to
the lower courtsJ

Congressional

Democrats not only failed to oppose the
Nixon Administration's lower
court appointments, they created numerous
new judicial positions for
the Administration to fill, despite the
latter's professed intention to
"pack" the courts.

How does one explain the complicity
of Congress on

the one hand, and the failure, on the other,
of the Nixon Administration
to take greater advantage of its opportunity?

As has been shown, the

behavior of Nixon appointees was not radically different
from that of
their predecessors.
For one thing. Southern Democrats, some of whom dominated
key

committees in the House and Senate, were essentially in harmony with the

Administration's views on criminal issues.

Liberal Democrats were

accused of being "coddlers" of criminals, in the over-simple rhetoric
of the aroused political climate of the time.
civil

liberties issues,

a

As with other complex

popular constituency for criminal defendants

was not available to support politicians who might have opposed tougher

anti-crime measures.

Finally, the Nixon Administration was freed by the

intermediate nature of circuit court appointments which are not the

responsibility of the organized opposition party (as Supreme Court
appointments are) or of individual Senators from his own party (as

district court appointments are).

As a result, the Nixon Administration

found less systematic and institutionalized opposition to its circuit

Although there is evidence of effective opposition from individual
Republican Senators, particularly in the second and third circuits, the
liberal voting scores of Nixon appointees in the second circuit are
based on only a few non-unanimous cases and conflict with their clearly
more "conservative" score on unanimously decided cases, which were
Thus these classifications must be regarded cautiously.
numerous.

.
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court appointments than to its Supreme
or District Court appointments,
since Congressional responsibility was
not as clearly defined at that
level

Why then was there no radical swing
to "conservatism" at the circuit level?

For one thing, the lower federal
judiciary was already

"conservative" if one compares it to the liberal
majority of the Warren

Court on confession issues, or if raw voting
statistics are examined
for fiscal

1973.

Secondly, because the Courts of Appeals lack
control

over their docket, cases there may pose fewer
opportunities for discretion than is the case on the Supreme Court.

Thirdly, conservative

parties in the United States have historically regarded the
unelected

judiciary as their natural ally against the leveling impulses of
popular
majorities.

Perhaps too, the Nixon Administration found itself ambiva-

lent about "court packing" and attacks on court credibility.

In a

similar way, the Republican Party has been closely tied to the American
Bar Association's Committee on Federal Judiciary since the Eisenhower

Administration.

This tie, explicitly acknowledged at the lower court

level, may have inhibited the appointment of "political animals" to the

Courts of Appeals, although Goldman has found that Nixon appointees had

more extensive political backgrounds than did Eisenhower appointees and
closely resembled Kennedy and Johnson appointees in the nature and extent
of their political

involvement.

2

Thus there are certain built in checks, Senatorial courtesy, the

American Bar Association, the commitment to an independent judiciary.

Sheldon Goldman, op. cit.
p.

941

,

"Johnson and Nixon Appointees,"
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the routine nature of many cases,
and the "professionalism"
of most
judges, which probably operate
to prevent radical and
uniform swings
in lower court policy and
personnel when conservative parties
are in

power, factors which may be weakened
when liberal parties are making
the appointments.

3

These factors probably account for
the basic similar-

ity of Nixon appointees to their brethren
on the United States Courts of

Appeals and the mild nature of the change
there.

Future Research

The findings of this study suggest several
possible areas for

future research:
(1)

In light of the discovery that Nixon appointees
were

considerably more "conservative" than non-Nixon Republicans on
criminal
cases in the fifth circuit, it would be interesting to study race

relations cases decided in that circuit from fiscal 1970 to the present
to see if the gap between Nixon appointees and non-Nixon Republicans

and Democrats extends to race relations cases.

This is of particular

interest because of the tacit linking of "law and order" and racism in
the Nixon and Wallace campaigns of 1958.
(2)

Another research possibility concerns the impact of higher

per judge caseloads on judicial behavior in the Courts of Appeals.

From

cursory view, it appears that there is

a

a

larger gap between judge

scores in unanimous and non-unanimous cases in the busier circuits,
than in those less busy.

This could be caused by the more perfunctory

-3

Of course the Senatorial check on Democratic Administrations
becomes rather formidable when the party also possesses a large
majority in Congress, as one can see from "conservative" nature of
Democratic appointees in the South.

142

nature of review in those circuits
or the more frivolous nature
of
appeals there, but the subject
deserves further exploration in light
of
the widely recognized problem of
the quality of justice in overcrowded
urban trial courts.
(3)

Instead of inferring the appointment
practices of the Nixon

Administration from campaign statements and
subsequent performance of
its nominees, one could attempt to gain
access to Justice Department

files and interview former Nixon Justice
Department officials to ascertain

how direct

a

factor law and order views of particular judges
were in the

selection or rejection of judges, and whether subsequent
judicial

performance conformed with promise at the time of the
appointment.

No

one has yet gained access to those files, however.
(4)

In light of the slim links discovered between voting
behavior

in criminal

cases and selected socio-political background character-

istics, research might be considerably revised to identify factors

related to early "socialization" of judges rather than to social class,
as voting in criminal

cases might be better related to "tough-mi ndedness"--

"tender-mindedness" than to
instance, is
ing,

a

"1

iberal ism"--"conservatism."^

Gender, for

characteristic related to differences in early condition-

although it would be of limited usefulness in the study of judges

because of the great preponderence of males in those positions.

Simi-

larly, religion might be examined more in terms of the nature and

influence of religious doctrine and moral concepts associated with them

There is support for this characterization in popular parlance
where judges or potential judges are characterized as "soft" or "tough"
on crime rather than "liberal" or "conservative." Additionally, it
can be argued that criminal issues at the appellate level are procedural
or "means" issues rather than "ends" issues.
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than in terms of the class
connotations of different religions.

Addi-

tionally, psychological questionnaires
might be utilized, although many
judges might be reluctant to
participate in such an exercise.
(5)

Finally, additional non-unanimous
criminal cases for fiscal

1974 and 1975 should be gathered so that
more of the Nixon appointees and

more circuits could be included in the
bloc analysis and so that more of
the Nixon appointees could be more
confidently characterized as to their
attitudes on criminal issues.

This is particularly important with

regard to the tentative nature of the findings
in the second and third

circuits which showed Nixon appointees to be more
liberal than the other
two groups on the basis of only a few cases.
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